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SUMMARY 
 
The United States of America has in its custody several hundred Taliban and Al Qaeda 
combatants who were captured after the September 11, 2001 attack and during the war in 
Afghanistan. These prisoners are incarcerated at the Guantanamo naval base in Cuba. The 
treatment given to these detainees has elicited widespread criticism, as well as 
unprecedented intellectual and legal debates regarding prisoners of war.  
 
In order to fully understand the position of the Guantanamo Bay detainees, one has to be 
aware of the origins of the prisoner-of-war phenomenon. From biblical times, through the 
countless conflicts that were waged across the globe through the ages, the concept of 
“prisoner of war” gradually evolved. Growing concern for the plight of prisoners of war was 
paralleled by the development of the laws of war, which sought to regulate the conduct of 
combatants during an armed conflict. The laws of war that have bearing on modern day 
States are those documented in the Geneva Conventions. 
 
The Geneva Conventions regulate armed conflicts and set out the requirements for prisoners 
of war, as well as their trial rights. The United States, in declaring the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees “unlawful combatants” or “illegal enemy combatants”, terms which are undefined 
in International Law, have sought to evade the prescripts of the Geneva Conventions. In 
direct contravention of the Geneva Conventions, the Guantanamo Bay detainees are denied 
the right to humane treatment, a fair trial and due process of the law. 
 
Prior to Hamdan vs Rumsfeld, the United States’ position was challenged with very little 
success. The Supreme Court, in Hamdan vs Rumsfeld, directed the president to accord the 
detainees the protections of the Third Geneva Convention. The relief brought by this 
decision was very short lived. In September 2006 the United States Congress passed the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006. This Bill gives the president of the United States 
unfettered power in dealing with anyone suspected of being a threat to the State, as well as 
the authorisation to interpret and apply the Geneva Conventions according to his sole 
discretion.      
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On September 11, 2001, the United States of America became the victim of an 
unprecedented terrorist attack. The use of hijacked passenger aircraft as lethal weapons 
flown into buildings resulted in the death of thousands of people. This event brought to light 
a new dimension of terrorism with a previously inconceivable scale of casualties, death and 
destruction. The apparent reason for the attack was to destroy American economic, military 
and political power. The attack forced the United States and the world to address the urgent 
issue of international terrorism. The outpouring of anger and helplessness in the United 
States culminated in the approval of military force against the persons responsible for the 
terror attack, namely, the Al Qaeda network.  
 
The western world, led by the United States, identified Al Qaeda, under the leadership of 
Osama bin Laden, as the main group responsible for the escalation of terror attacks 
worldwide. Al Qaeda was supported by one of the world’s most repressive governments 
namely, the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban government of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s Emir –
General, Osama bin Muhammed bin Laden, the son of immigrants, was born in Riyahd, 
Saudi Arabia, on July 30, 1957. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, bin Laden left for 
Pakistan where he came under the influence of the Jordanian Palestinian, Sheikh Dr 
Abdullah Azzam, an influential member of the Jordanian Brotherhood. In 1984, bin Laden 
and Azzam established the Afghan Service Bureau (MAK), which organized, trained and 
financed the anti-Soviet resistance. Contrary to popular belief, it was Azzam and not bin 
Laden, who conceptualized and formulated the broad doctrine of Al Qaeda. 
 
Al Qaeda planned and executed its terrorist operations from its base in Afghanistan. United 
States Armed Forces were dispatched to Afghanistan with the explicit objective to use all 
necessary and appropriate force to apprehend and destroy the perpetrators of the September 
11 terror attacks. The invasion of Afghanistan by the United States-led Alliance led to the 
capture of hundreds of Taliban and Al Qaeda combatants. On January 11, 2002, the first 
captured prisoners of war were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. These detainees were 
labeled by the United States as “unlawful combatants”, who were not entitled to claim 
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prisoner of war status as provided for in terms of the Third Geneva Convention. The position 
adopted by the United States regarding prisoner of war status for the Guantanamo detainees 
elicited unprecedented legal and intellectual debate. This debate focused world attention on a 
number of International Law instruments, specifically the Third Geneva Convention dealing 
with the treatment of prisoners of war during armed conflict.     
 
This treatise will examine the relevant aspects of International Law which deal with the 
treatment of prisoners of war. The historical development of the law relating to prisoners of 
war will be dealt with first. This will entail a brief discussion of developments regarding 
prisoners of war from Biblical times until after the Second World War. Secondly, the laws of 
war will be discussed with specific reference to international and non-international armed 
conflict. In this chapter reference to various International Law instruments will be made. 
Thirdly, the difference between a lawful and an unlawful combatant will be discussed. 
Thereafter, the applicability of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention to the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees will be dealt with. In Chapter 5 a brief discussion will follow on 
the Guantanamo Bay detainees and their trial rights. The discussion is concluded in Chapter 
6.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW RELATING TO 
PRISONERS OF WAR 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“ Prisoners of War!  That is the least kind of prisoner to be, but it is nevertheless a melancholy 
state.  You are in the power of your enemy.  You owe your life to his humanity, and your daily 
bread to his compassion.  You must obey his orders, go where he tells you, stay where you are 
bid, await his pleasure, possess your soul in patience.”1
  Winston S.Churchill 
 
There appears to be no documentary evidence of the origins of Humanitarian Law or the 
“author” of International Humanitarian Law. Existing evidence indicates that during 
confrontations between tribes and clans, rules were established to limit the effects of these 
violent battles. These rules were present in all cultures, and were, in effect, the forerunner of the 
present International Humanitarian Law. These rules are to be found in cultural and religious 
books such as the Indian Mahabharata, the Bible and the Quran. In Japanese culture, the rules on 
the art of war, which are the rules of Manu, or the bushido, constitute the Japanese code of 
behaviour.2  
 
According to Levie, the development of Humanitarian Law preceded the use of the term 
“prisoner of war” as it appears in the four existing Geneva Conventions to describe individuals 
captured during an armed conflict.3  The development of Humanitarian Law stems in part from 
the objective of religious figures. Levie remarks that early history does not record that captured 
persons enjoyed any protection in terms of any rules and customs, and that they were 
summarily executed with no differentiation between man, woman or child, combatant or non- 
combatant.4  During Christian Biblical times5, for instance, the practice of executing captured 
civilians or combatants was common among warring nations and the captured individual was 
considered to be the property of the captor who could kill or refrain from killing the captive.6  
                                                 
1  Levie  Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict  (1907) 1. 
2  Gasser  in Haug  Humanity for All: International Humanitarian Law (1993) 6 . 
3  Levie 2. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Joshua 6:21, 10:35; Numbers 31:7, 8, 17 Classics Devotional Bible (1996). 
6  Levie  3. 
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This practice continued unabated for centuries.7  The captured combatant became the captors’ 
“chattel”.8 Islam, on the other hand, is credited by Mawdudi for conceptualizing humane and 
decent rules of war.9 Mawdudi also credits the great work of Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis,10 
for influencing the introduction of humane practices during the 17th Century. For example, 
with the advent of the period of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, Islam propagated that slaves 
should be set free. Muslims, i.e. followers of Islam, heeded this directive. Forty years later, 
prisoners of war captured on the battlefield were the only slaves left in Islamic society. These 
captives were either exchanged for Muslim soldiers or ransomed. If the captives were not 
exchanged or ransomed, the captor Muslim government gave them to the soldiers that captured 
them. This was seen as a humane manner of disposing of them, rather than incarcerating them 
and forcing them to work.11   
 
Islam interprets war as the means of taking up arms against the enemy. War is called “jihad”, 
which means “to fight against the enemy”. Such a fight is deemed to be both a lawful and 
necessary means of suppressing aggression.12 However, it was never the intent of Islam to 
propagate war as a national policy or to gain spoils. Therefore, Muslims are not warmongers 
and neither do they desire to kill or mutilate other human beings. Muslim jurists contend that 
in the face of an attack or armed aggression Muslims will resort to war. Islam is, however, 
emphatic in its doctrine that civilians and non-combatants are not to be killed or attacked.13  
 
The development of Humanitarian Law was also influenced by the economic and political 
imperatives that prevailed in different historical eras. During the Egyptian and 
Mesopotamian eras the practice of executing captives was abolished for economic rather 
than humanitarian reasons.14  Captives were deployed to work in the fields to enhance the 
agricultural economy.15  The Romans followed this practice and developed the rules 
regarding the treatment of enslaved enemy captives.16  With the collapse of the Roman 
Empire and the advent of the Dark Ages, the practice of enslaving enemy combatants was 
                                                 
7  Levie 3. 
8  Pictet Commentary on Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August       
          12, 1949 (1960) 4. 
9          Mawdudi 35. 
10        On the Laws of War and Peace.  
11        Mawdudi 20. 
12        al-Zuhili in Pfanner (ed) Islam and International Law (June 2005) 280. 
13        Ibid.  
14  Levie 3. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid. 
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abolished.17  During the Crusades, however, the rights of captured enemy persons became 
non-existent again and the ruthless execution and enslavement of captives continued 
relentlessly.18  
 
An upswing in the fortunes of prisoners of war occurred during the Middle Ages when the 
chivalric code was adopted to determine battlefield conduct in wars between Christians. This 
code allowed warring parties to enter into agreements regarding the fate of prisoners of 
war.19 In wars between Christians, for example, the Lateran Council of 1179 prevented 
captors from selling or enslaving captured combatants. Christians were not the only 
adherents of these rules. For example, Saladin, the commander of the Islamic army, allowed 
wounded Christian soldiers to receive care during the Crusades and the exchange of captives 
between Muslims and Christians occurred regularly.20 Towards the conclusion of the Thirty 
Years War (1648), the notion of the captive being the property of the individual captor had 
ceased and the accepted practice was that the captive was in the custody of the State and not 
the individual captor, a principle on which the humanitarian treatment of prisoners was 
founded.21
 
 From the above it would appear that it was the objective of religious figures, wise men and 
warlords, from the earliest periods of history, to adopt rules to limit the consequences of 
armed conflict.22 Today, the rules governing armed conflict are formalized as Humanitarian 
Law, which focuses on the protection, life and freedom of the individual. The branch of 
Humanitarian Law applicable to armed conflict is the Law of Geneva, which includes the 
four Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols.23 The Law of Geneva, which 
was developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross,24 is focused on the safety 
and treatment of military personnel not active in hostilities, as well as victims such as 
prisoners of war. Geneva Law limits the right which the State has over the rights of the 
individual.25
 
                                                 
17  Levie 4. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Gasser in Haug  7. 
20  Coursier  59.  
21  Levie 5. 
22  Gasser  in Haug  7. 
23  Pictet  Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (1985) 2.   
24  Hereinafter referred to as the ICRC.  
25  Pictet  2. 
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Resulting from the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the Law of The Hague on the other 
hand, is focused on the lawful monitoring of conflicts.26 Hague Law contains provisions 
regarding the status of prisoners of war, the status of wounded and shipwrecked persons and 
civilians. These provisions were made part of Geneva Law in 1929 and 1949.27 The 1977 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions embody provisions that relate to the 
conduct of soldiers, which in effect belong in the Law of The Hague. This shows that the 
distinction between the Law of Geneva and that of The Hague is beginning to fade.28
 
2.2 THE POSITION PRIOR TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR  
 
International Law finds its origin from, amongst others, Treaty Law and Customary 
International Law. Customary International Humanitarian Law is therefore a major source of 
the rules applicable during armed conflicts. A rule is considered binding Customary Law if it 
reflects the “widespread, representative and uniform” practice of States as accepted by law 
29 and expressed in “military manuals, legislation, case law and official statements.” Formal 
acceptance of these rules of Customary Law is not a requirement for it to be binding on 
States.30 Treaty Law on the other hand, such as the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its 
1977 Additional Protocols, is based on written conventions where States formally establish 
certain rules. Treaty Law, according to the ICRC, cannot adequately deal with the legal 
protections of individuals affected by non-international armed conflict where the suffering of 
people is severe.31 Customary International Humanitarian Law fills this gap where Treaty 
Law is silent on attacks on civilian targets. All parties, including resistance and rebel groups, 
are bound by applicable customary law to refrain from such attacks.32 In light of the above, 
it is lamentable, therefore, that universal ratification of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
has been accomplished, while ratification of its 1977 Additional Protocols has stalled.33 The 
latter abound with rules and principles that reflect Customary Law, which is applicable to all 
                                                 
26  Pictet 2. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Henckaerts  in Pfanner (ed) Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the   
          Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict IRRC (March 2005) 170. 
30  Henckaerts 179. 
31  Henckaerts 178. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
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States, notwithstanding their ratification of other treaties. These customary rules apply 
regardless of whether the conflict is international or non-international.34
 
The idea of formalizing the treatment of prisoners of war was conceived by Jean Henry 
Dunant in 1859.35 Dunant was born on May 8, 1828 in Geneva, Switzerland. Due to his 
mother’s influence and the Calvinist atmosphere in Geneva, Dunant’s religious convictions 
and high moral principles were deep-rooted. He was involved in a number of movements 
that engaged in charitable and religious projects that were beneficial to the poor, sick and 
afflicted.36 Dunant was instrumental in unifying The Young Men’s Christian Union in 
Europe with the Young Men’s Christian Association in England, into a World Union in 
1855.37 His idea of formalizing the treatment of prisoners of war was a result of his 
witnessing firsthand the suffering of the thousands of unattended, wounded combatants in 
the armed conflict during the War of Italian Unification in 1859 at Solferino in northern 
Italy.38  This experience at Solferino inspired him to author his book, A Memory of Solferino 
in 1862.39
 
A Memory of Solferino documents Dunant’s 40 ideas and proposals about how to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the suffering he witnessed in Solferino.41 On the one hand, it raises the 
question of whether it would be possible in peaceful times to form “relief societies for the 
purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime” by devoted and qualified 
volunteers.42 On the other hand, Dunant enquires from the military authorities of a number 
of countries whether they could formulate “some international principle, sanctioned by a 
convention inviolate in character”, which, once agreed upon, would serve as the basis for the 
relief societies.43 The formulation of this principle became, in effect, the precursor to the 
Geneva Conventions.44 The success of Dunant’s work led to the establishment of a five man 
committee, comprising of Dunant, Gustave Moynier, General Dufour, Dr Louis Appa and Dr 
                                                 
34     Henckaerts 177. 
35  Pictet 3. 
36     Dunant   A Memory of Solferino (1939) 7. 
37      Dunant 8. 
38     Dunant 64. 
39     Ibid. 
40     Dunant 64. 
41     Dunant 129. 
42      Ibid. 
43      Dunant 129.  
44  Ibid. 
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Theodore Maunoir.45 This committee was known as the International Committee for Relief 
to the Wounded, which met for the first time on February 17, 1863.46 The second meeting 
was held on March 13, 1863 and on August 25, 1863 the Committee decided to convene an 
international conference in Geneva, which took place in October 1863.47
 
The 1863 conference took as a basis for discussion, a draft convention prepared by the 
International Committee for Relief to the Wounded and the conference concluded with the 
adoption of ten resolutions, which formed the first draft of the charter for the envisaged 
organization, the ICRC, which was to be formed.48 Because of the continuous improvement 
in the treatment of prisoners of war, a new school of thought developed which held that the 
inhumane treatment of prisoners of war had no place in civilized society.49 The King’s 
advocate fittingly summarizes this belief as follows: 
 
“… cases may possibly occur in which the treatment of Prisoners of War by a nation may be so 
barbarous and inhuman as to call upon other powers to make common cause against it, and to take 
such measures as may be necessary to compel it to abandon such practice, and to conform itself to 
the more lenient exercise of the rights of war, adopted by other states …”50
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century various attempts were made to codify the laws of 
war and these efforts led to the “first effective multilateral codification of the law of war”.51 
It must be noted, however, that the movement pioneered by Dunant was preceded and 
paralleled by other developments in different parts of the world. Arguably the first attempt to 
codify the rules of Humanitarian Law in the West took place during the seventeenth century 
in 1648.52 Article 43 of the Treaty of Westphalia determined how prisoners of war should be 
treated and specifically that prisoners of war should not be kept incarcerated, but freed 
“without payment of ransom and without any exception or reservation”.53
 
                                                 
45  Boissier  History of the International Committee of the Red Cross, from Solferino to Tsushima (1978) 54.   
46  Boissier 57.     
47   Ibid. 
48   Boissier 58. 
49  Levie 7. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Levie 8. 
52    Montejo  “A Study of Prisoners of War in the Twentieth Century” (1997) [online] available at  
           http://newman.baruch.cuny.edu/digital/2000/honors/montejo_1997.htm  4 (accessed on 7 November  
   2005). 
53     Montejo 4 (accessed on 7 November 2005).  
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In 1785 the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the United States during 
peacetime, provided for the protection of prisoners of war in the event of war breaking out 
between the two nations.54 The purpose of its provisions was “to prevent the destruction of 
prisoners of war”.55 This initiative moved the French National Assembly to pass legislation 
that unilaterally formalized a code of humanitarian rules to regulate the treatment of 
prisoners of war.56  
 
A similar attempt at formalizing Humanitarian Law was made by a German-American 
philosopher, Francis Lieber.57 Lieber engaged in student politics and was harassed by the 
police for his liberal ideas. As a result of this harassment, he was forced to flee to England in 
1826.58 In England, Lieber lectured in history and Political Economy from 1835 to 1856.59 It 
was during the American Civil War that Lieber prepared a standardized code for conduct 
during armed conflict 60 for the forces of the Union Government. This code of conduct was 
formally issued by United States President Abraham Lincoln as General Orders No. 100 of 
1863, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States of America in the 
Field.61 These Instructions became known as the Lieber Code.62 The code embodied the first 
ever stipulation that there should be no retaliation against prisoners of war.63 It further 
attempted to minimize destruction and to protect civilians.64 The main sections of the Code 
were concerned with martial law, military jurisdiction, the treatment of spies and deserters 
and how prisoners of war should be treated.65 It was the first codified law that expressly 
forbade giving “no quarter” to the enemy, except in cases where the survival of the unit that 
held the captured prisoners, was threatened.66 The Lieber Code became a recognized 
authority on military law that influenced war conduct for many years. 
 
                                                 
54    Levie 6. 
55   Ibid. 
56   Ibid. 
57        Montejo 5 (accessed on  November 7, 2005).  
58        Ibid. 
59        Ibid. 
60        Ibid. 
61        Gasser in Haug 9. 
62        Ibid 
63  Pictet Commentary on Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12   
August, 1949  5. 
64        Montejo 5 (accessed on 7 November, 2005). 
65        Ibid. 
66  Ibid. 
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There were several further international attempts by governments to formalize the treatment 
of prisoners of war. One of these is the draft International Declaration that was formulated at 
the 1874 international conference in Brussels.67 Although the result of this conference, the 
Declaration of Brussels, never developed into an international instrument, it played a major 
role in future international discussion on the codification of International Humanitarian 
Law.68 The Oxford Manual written by the International Law Institute in 1880 followed the 
Declaration of Brussels.69  
 
However, it was only with the formulation of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 that 
a Detaining Power legally protected prisoners of war from inhumane treatment.70 The 
Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which dealt with the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, prohibited arbitrary treatment of prisoners of war by a 
State.71 When the Hague Regulations proved to be inadequate, they were revised through the 
Berne agreements of 1917 and 1918.72  
 
All the attempts at providing protection and assistance for prisoners of war came to fruition 
during the First World War of 1914 to 1918, when an International Prisoner of War Agency 
was formed at Geneva.73  It was at this stage that the efforts by the ICRC to improve the 
conditions of prisoners of war, was recognized.74  In 1921 the ICRC’s proposals were 
officially accepted and the organization was requested to compile and submit a draft code, 
which subsequently was presented and accepted at the 1929 Diplomatic Conference,75 which 
took place at Geneva in Switzerland.  This code became known as the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of July 27, 1929.76  It was accepted that the 
protections accorded prisoners of war by the newly formulated 1929 Convention, which was 
in force throughout the Second World War, were superior to the treatment prisoners of war 
received during the First World War.77  
 
                                                 
67  Pictet Commentary 5. 
68  Ibid 
69  Ibid. 
70  Ibid. 
71        Ibid. 
72  Ibid.  
73  Pictet Commentary  3. 
74  Pictet Commentary  4. 
75  Ibid. 
76        Ibid.   
77  Pictet Commentary  5. 
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2.3 THE POSITION AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
Changes in the conduct and consequences of war necessitated the re-conceptualisation of a 
number of provisions of the 1929 Convention.78  It was felt that the categories of persons 
entitled to prisoner of war status should be broadened.79  The provisions that were reviewed 
were the following: 
 
(i) The granting of prisoner of war status to members of armed forces that surrendered; 
 
(ii) The regulation of work being done by prisoners of war, assistance received by them 
and judicial proceedings they are involved in; 
 
(iii) The immediate release and repatriation of prisoners of war after the end of an armed 
conflict; and 
 
(iv) The independence of the agencies responsible for the monitoring of the protections 
and rights of prisoners of war.80 
 
In response to these concerns the ICRC immediately convened a further Diplomatic 
Conference in Geneva in 1949, with the intention of reviewing and rectifying the 
shortcomings exposed during the Second World War.81 The 1949 Diplomatic Conference 
had to deliberate and decide on a number of important issues, such as the declaration or 
warning of the commencement of a conflict, which was not adhered to in all situations.82 In 
the interim the ICRC convened a Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies in 
1946 to address this issue and it was recommended that the article dealing with the 
declaration of war be revised.83 At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the new article was 
adopted without any discussion by the delegates. The article read as follows: 
 
                                                 
78  Pictet Commentary  6. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Levie 10. 
82  Pictet Commentary 19.  
83  Pictet Commentary 20. 
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“…the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”84
 
The deliberations led to the formulation of a new set of rules governing the treatment of 
prisoners of war, which became the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.85
 
As the initiator of the process, which led to the formulation of the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949, the ICRC is widely regarded as the developer of International 
Humanitarian Law.86 The objective of the further development was to lessen the severity of 
the conduct of parties during armed conflicts. The ICRC also led the process of concluding 
and revising the provisions of the Geneva Conventions which dealt with the protection of 
victims in armed conflicts.87 The Conventions were adequate for the demands of the time, 
and saved countless of lives. However, not all facets of human suffering during wars were 
covered satisfactorily.88 For this reason the Geneva Conventions were expanded in 1949.89 
The first three Conventions: for the wounded and sick; the shipwrecked; and for prisoners of 
war, were reviewed and improved. The new Fourth Convention provided protection against 
unlawful enemy acts.90     
 
Since the formalization of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 until the present, every continent 
has been affected with a number of armed conflicts.91 Although legal protection was 
guaranteed for individuals not active in the conflict, as well as civilians, a number of 
fatalities were caused by violations of the provisions of International Humanitarian Law.92 
There was consensus that an unwillingness to apply the provisions was instrumental in the 
large number of violations that were taking place.93  
 
                                                 
84  Pictet Commentary 20.  
85  Levie 10. 
86  Pictet Commentary on the Additional Protocols of June 8, 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949 XXIX.  
87  Pictet Commentary on the Additional Protocols XXIX.  
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid. 
90  The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War of August 12,  
 1949.  
91  Henckaerts 175. 
92  Henckaerts 176. 
93  Ibid. 
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By the early 1970’s it appeared that the reviewed and improved provisions were inadequate 
and also that the Law of The Hague, which dealt with the development of the rules of 
hostilities and the use of weapons, required urgent revision. The Law of The Hague had not 
been revised since 1907.94 Therefore, an immediate agenda that focused on development 
was initiated to revise the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land. The issues to be developed dealt with the conduct of combatants and the protection of 
civilians from the effects of armed conflict.95 At the XIXth International Conference of the 
ICRC at New Delhi, in 1957, draft rules regarding the protection of civilians were adopted. 
This draft did not receive the expected support from governments because of the 
implications that it had for the use of nuclear weapons.96  
 
At the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross at Vienna in 1965, Resolution 
XXVIII adopted four principles dealing with the protection of civilians against 
indiscriminate warfare.97 The Conference strongly advised the ICRC to develop 
International Humanitarian Law.98 Acting on this advice the ICRC engaged all signatories to 
the Geneva Conventions by issuing a memorandum dated May 19, 1967 regarding the issue 
of developing International Humanitarian Law.99
 
In May 1968 the United Nations expressed its interest and mandated the Secretary-General 
to establish contact with the ICRC.100 During September 1968 the ICRC presented its ideas 
to the National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Geneva.101 The objective was 
not to rewrite or to revise, but to formulate additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, 
which would guarantee, cover and clarify important points concerning protection for victims 
of armed conflict.102 The ICRC presented a report at the XXIst International Conference of 
the Red Cross in September 1969 where the Conference confirmed and formalized the 
ICRC’s mandate in terms of Resolution No XIII to investigate and propose rules, which 
would enhance existing Humanitarian Law.103
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 The ICRC then convened the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts from May 
24 to June 12, 1971.104 The ICRC drafted documentation that focused on the mandate to put 
forward proposals.105 The first draft text was submitted to all the National Societies of the 
Red Cross in March 1972. Thereafter the draft text was presented to the XXIInd   
International Conference of the Red Cross in Teheran in November 1973, where it was 
adopted in terms of Resolution XIII as draft protocols.106  
 
The adoption of the draft protocols placed upon governments the responsibility of 
formalising and applying the provisions in situations that demanded it. The formal adoption 
of the draft protocols took place when the Swiss government convened the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Re-affirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed conflicts, with the first of four sessions taking place from February 20, 
to March 29, 1974.107 The formal adoption of the Additional Protocols took place on June 8, 
1977.108    
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
As part of International Humanitarian Law, the Geneva Conventions109 and their Additional 
Protocols110 provide the international community with a whole system of legal safeguards 
that cover the way wars may be fought as well as the protection of individuals. They 
specifically protect non-combatants and combatants who are not active anymore, such as 
prisoners of war and sick and shipwrecked troops. These treaties demand that measures are 
put in place to deter breaches of its provisions and to hold individuals who commit breaches 
responsible for their actions.   
                                                 
104   Pictet Commentary on the Additional Protocols  XXXI. 
105   Ibid. 
106   Pictet Commentary  on the Additional Protocols  XXXI. 
107   Pictet Commentary  on the Additional Protocols  XXXII. 
108   Pictet Commentary on the Additional Protocols   XXXIII. 
109       The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed  
 Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949; The Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the  
 Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949; 
The Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949; The 
Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 
1949. 
110   Additional Protocols of June 8, 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. 
14 
 
 The revision of the 1929 Convention111 was a major step in placing obligations on States to 
accord prisoners of war the rights and protections they are entitled to, and to respect the 
human dignity of the individual. In this respect the 1949 Conventions represented an 
enormous advancement in Humanitarian Law.  This advancement ensured that members of 
armed forces captured during an armed conflict are guaranteed the protections that go hand 
in hand with prisoner of war status; a status which is determined by whether a captured 
combatant has fulfilled the requirements set by the Third Convention. The Geneva 
Conventions benefited thousands of individuals with its constant development and 
adaptation to the needs of the situations, but it still did not deal with all aspects of the 
suffering of the victims of war. As mentioned above, the vacuum regarding the suffering of 
the victims of war led to further discussion, which subsequently culminated in the adoption 
of the Additional Protocols. 
 
The Afghanistan conflict resulted in the capture and detention of a number of Al Qaeda and 
Taliban combatants. A situation developed which demanded clarity on how and in terms of 
which law these combatants are to be treated. Central to this situation was the question of 
whether or not the Afghanistan conflict was subject to the Geneva Conventions.112 The 
status of prisoners of war and, more specifically, the status of the Al Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and how they are to be treated, will be dealt with in view of 
the applicable International Humanitarian Law.  
 
In light of the controversy surrounding the treatment of the Al Qaeda and Taliban captives, 
the United States had to consider two policy issues: (i) an approach which satisfy the 
demands for national security by indefinitely incarcerating dangerous individuals, eliciting 
information from them and effectively punishing those guilty of committing or supporting 
the hostile acts of September 11, 2001 and (ii) the injunction to adhere to the requirements of 
the laws of war by allowing due processes of the law to take its course as far as the 
perpetrators of September 11 are concerned.113 The following chapter will discuss the laws 
of war with reference to the classification of the Afghanistan conflict as either an 
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international or a non- international armed conflict and the distinction between a combatant 
and non-combatant.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE LAWS OF WAR 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
When States are unable to resolve disputes it leads to war. Wars are naked outbursts of 
primitive, raw violence, of which the result in suffering and damage cannot be measured. 
The laws of war, which are now called International Humanitarian Law, attempt to reduce 
the human suffering and material damage.114 This branch of International Law attempts to 
regulate military operations in order to mitigate human suffering. Most importantly, it 
determines that parties to an armed conflict must protect and preserve persons not active in 
the hostilities.115
 
Although the establishment of rules of war was historically part of the policies of certain 
governments, the process of establishing these rules had to contend with radical changes in 
the way war was conducted. The introduction of new weaponry and new strategies resulted 
in a “new warfare” which proved difficult to regulate. The perception that the laws and 
customs of war were of no consequence in the “new warfare” led the parties in an armed 
conflict to evade the rules of war. The humanitarian Conventions brought a semblance of 
stability, but indiscriminate utilization of new, destructive weapons limited regulation 
thereof.116  
 
The laws of war, as codified in the Geneva Conventions, encompass diverse groups of rules: 
rules regulating armed conflict on land, sea and air, and rules protecting the victims of 
war.117 These groups of rules also cover civilians and individuals not active in hostile 
operations, such as prisoners of war. The Law of Geneva demands that parties to an armed 
conflict respect, protect and treat humanely, war casualties and prisoners of war.118 It is, 
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however, a growing concern that the reason why warring parties do not commit excesses is 
not because of the existence of these rules, but because of the fear of retaliatory measures.119  
 
According to Mawdudi,120 the laws of war adopted in the nineteenth century do not meet the 
requirements of laws, because a number of nations are reluctant to adhere to the provisions 
thereof if their adversaries do not adhere to it. Mawdudi, therefore, is of the opinion that this 
is the reason why International Law is continuously disregarded.121 Islamic rules, in contrast, 
brought a semblance of civility and humanity to war, irrespective of how the enemies of 
Islam behaved.  
 
The humaneness of Islamic rules of war is attributed to the Prophet Muhammed. 
Approximately one thousand four hundred years ago, according to Islamic faith, the Prophet 
Muhammed issued an instruction to Muslims to “treat the prisoners of war kindly”.122 
Consistent with this instruction, Muslims were subjected to specific laws of war, which set 
out in detail when, against whom, and how to wage war. During the era of the Prophet, 
prisoners of war received treatment of such high standards that it surpassed anything similar 
elsewhere in the world. The basic rule set and followed by Islam is that “the captive is 
protected by his captivity and the wounded by his injury”.123 It is therefore noteworthy that 
the Western world ultimately embraced the laws of war introduced by Islam centuries 
ago.124
 
3.2 THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL OR NON-
INTERNATIONAL 
 
The Geneva Conventions regulate the relationship between States, and not relationships 
between States and private organizations.125 This is clearly set out in all four Geneva 
Conventions, which state: “This present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
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or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”126  The Geneva 
Conventions further regulate “armed conflict not of an international character”.127 It appears 
that common Article 3 refers specifically to a conflict between a State and an armed 
movement within its territory, and does not include all armed conflicts. In particular, it does 
not include international armed conflicts involving international terrorist organizations.128 It 
is further clear that Article 3 addresses only non-international conflicts that occur within the 
borders of a State party; in other words, civil wars. Article 3, therefore, does not cover a 
conflict where one of the parties is conducting hostile operations from bases in different 
States.129 An example of the latter was the armed struggle waged between the African 
National Congress130 and the South African Nationalist Government. During this conflict the 
ANC demanded that their combatants be accorded prisoner of war status, a demand that the 
Nationalist Government rejected.  
 
It is accepted practice that the legal status of opposing parties to a conflict determines 
whether it is an international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict and, 
specifically, whether the conflict is waged, not by States, but by one State against one or 
more armed groups within its territory.131 The United States Department of Justice’s position 
is that when the Geneva Conventions were adopted, international thinking was focused on 
two forms of armed conflict, namely hostilities between two States, subject to Article 2, and 
civil war within the borders of a nation-State.132  
 
The laws of war went through three developmental stages. The first stage was characterized 
by uncertainty as to whether the armed conflict constituted belligerency or insurgency. 
Belligerency was seen as a conflict between sovereign States, and insurgency as a conflict 
within the borders of a sovereign State. These were deemed by International Law to be 
different classes of conflict. Therefore, wars between States were subject to specific 
international legal rules, which governed the conduct of the warring parties and protected 
non-combatants. However, non-international conflicts within a State’s borders were subject 
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to very few international legal rules. This first stage clearly represented a sovereignty-
oriented phase.133  
 
The second phase from 1936 to 1939 brought about a change in State practice, which saw 
the application of Humanitarian Law in conflicts that were essentially large-scale civil 
wars.134  Uncertainty remained about whether the provisions of Article 3 were applicable to 
fully-fledged civil wars.135  
  
The third phase ushered in a radical shift from the “State-sovereignty-oriented approach” of 
International Law.136 Individual human rights were the focal point of this new approach, 
and, as a result, the distinction between international and internal armed conflicts became 
blurred. During the Bosnian conflict, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia,137 in a decision138 that illustrates the acceptance of the human rights 
approach, creates the impression that Article 3 is applicable to all armed conflicts.139 This 
interpretation by the ICTY suggests that Article 3 might include the armed conflict between 
the United States and Al Qaeda, which would then trigger the application of the provisions 
that deal with the treatment of prisoners of war.140    
 
In contrast to the ICTY, the United States appear to interpret Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions according to the letter rather than the spirit of the law by arguing that the 
thinking of the time did not anticipate the notion of an armed conflict in which the warring 
parties are a nation- State and an international terrorist movement, respectively. Because of 
their claims that Article 3 was not drafted with this type of conflict in mind, the United 
States State Department’s position is that the conflict between the United States and Al 
Qaeda is not covered by the Conventions.141 The argument put forward by the United States 
is strengthened by the fact that two new protocols additional to the Conventions were 
adopted142 to address shortcomings in Geneva Conventions I to IV. Because the United 
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States did not ratify Additional Protocols I and II, they do not consider themselves subject to 
it. 143  
 
In view of the United States’ interpretation that Al Qaeda is both a non-State actor and a 
non-governmental terrorist organization, which has members in different countries, the 
United States concluded that the conflict between them and Al Qaeda is not subject to the 
Third Geneva Convention.144 Article 3, read with Article 2, confirms that only conflicts 
between States, and civil wars, are provided for in the Conventions. The United States-Al 
Qaeda conflict, therefore, does not fit either category because Al Qaeda is not a State and, as 
a result, cannot be a party to an international conflict between nation-States in terms of 
common Article 2. In terms of common Article 3, the conflict between the United States and 
Al Qaeda does not fit the description of a civil war, because Al Qaeda launches its hostile 
operations from different countries.145 It therefore seems that the conflict between the United 
States and Al Qaeda is undefined in International Humanitarian Law.   
 
The applicability of the Geneva Conventions regarding the detention of the Taliban 
combatants is less complicated because Afghanistan is a signatory to the four Geneva 
Conventions. It may be argued, therefore, that the Geneva Conventions are applicable to the 
Taliban detainees.146 However, in terms of the United States Constitution,147 the President is 
authorized to suspend United States treaty obligations if there are sufficient grounds to 
justify such a decision.148 It is submitted that such a decision to suspend treaty obligations 
would not be correct, as a country’s domestic law may not override the provisions of 
International Law.  
 
The United States Defence Department’s contention is that sufficient grounds existed during 
the Afghanistan conflict for the President of the United States to suspend the latter’s treaty 
obligations towards Afghanistan.149 The following compelling reasons appeared to justify 
the suspension:  
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(i) The Taliban, whose members were armed and violent, held large areas in Afghanistan. 
Therefore, Afghanistan was a “failed state”, with no operating government structure. In 
reality, Afghanistan was incapable of honouring any of its international obligations. In 
view of Afghanistan’s incapacity, the United States could, therefore, exercise its 
discretion to suspend its treaty obligations towards the Taliban government.150  
(ii)  Sufficient reason existed to confirm the Taliban’s dependence on the terrorist Al 
Qaeda organization. It was widely accepted that the influence Al Qaeda exerted over 
the Taliban had reached a stage where the latter could not formulate foreign policy 
with the global community.151 This effectively rendered the Taliban a terrorist 
organization and not a legitimate government.152 In light of the above, the United 
States contends that the Third Geneva Convention, specifically those provisions 
dealing with the status of prisoners of war, should be interpreted as not covering the 
Taliban combatants.153  Therefore, it is submitted that the United States did not want to 
honour its treaty obligations with regard to Afghanistan.   
 
The American Executive Presidential decision issued on February 7, 2002 directed that Al 
Qaeda combatants would not be afforded the protection of the Geneva Conventions, 
irrespective of whether the conflict was in Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world.154 
Regarding the Taliban, it was decided that the Geneva Conventions were applicable to them, 
but that the Taliban combatants would not be granted the protections of the Third Geneva 
Convention because they were unlawful combatants.155 It is submitted that the Presidential 
decision clearly demonstrates the application of double standards. In view of this decision by 
the President of the United States there is a clear need to distinguish between a lawful 
combatant and an unlawful combatant in terms of International Law. This distinction will be 
dealt with in the following section. 
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3.3 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A LAWFUL COMBATANT AND UNLAWFUL   
COMBATANT 
 
All members of the armed forces of a country, except medical and religious personnel, are 
entitled to carry out acts of war during times of war.156 These members are referred to as 
combatants. The first attempt at formulating an internationally accepted definition of a 
combatant was embodied in the Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War, which was adopted by the Brussels Conference of fifteen European 
States, convened by Alexander II of Russia in 1874.157  
 
Much controversy and criticism regarding the status and treatment of the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees have been generated worldwide. Issues that were raised included the question of 
whether the status of the detainees would be determined outside the parameters of the 
Geneva Conventions, and also the question of what requirements needed to be met to 
determine their status.158 Green contends that the Hague Regulations’ definition of a 
combatant, and whether the combatant is entitled to prisoner of war status if captured, should 
be considered in view of the Third Geneva Convention,159 which regulates the rights and 
responsibilities of combatants during armed conflicts. 
 
Humanitarian Law divides individuals into distinct categories in the event of them being 
captured by opposing forces during an armed conflict. This principle of distinction forms 
one of the foundations of Humanitarian Law on which the rules of Conventions and 
Customary Law are founded.160 The principle of distinction finds application when the 
category and status of combatants and non-combatants must be determined. In other words, 
the category and status that need to be determined are of those individuals who have a right 
to prisoner of war status when captured, and those individuals who are not entitled 
thereto.161
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 The Third Geneva Convention defines two categories of enemy combatants:  
(i) Lawful enemy combatants who form part of the regular armed force of a party to the 
conflict and, when captured, are termed “prisoners of war” and, therefore, should be 
accorded the protection guaranteed by the Third Geneva Convention.162   
(ii) The second category of lawful enemy combatants who are not absorbed into a regular 
armed force, but are members of other organized militia or resistance movements who 
have to fulfill specific criteria to be accorded prisoner of war status.163      
 
When the United States Administration established the detention centres at Guantanamo Bay 
to hold combatants captured during the Afghanistan conflict, as well as suspected terrorists, 
it undertook to respect and consider the spirit of the Third Geneva Convention as far as 
prisoners of war was concerned. The underlying purpose was to guarantee the humane 
treatment of their prisoners of war.164 Some of the relevant provisions which the 
Administration had to observe but did not, and now were compelled to observe after the 
United States Supreme Court ruling in Hamdan vs Rumsfeld165 on June 29, 2006, regarding 
prisoners of war are the following:  
 
(i) Prisoners of war are required to only divulge their name, rank, date of birth and army 
serial number. Any other information cannot be demanded from them, neither can it be 
elicited from them by force.166  
(ii) Prisoners of war must be removed from the conflict zone immediately after being taken 
captive.167 
(iii) Their removal must be effected in the same way as is done for the forces of the 
Detaining Power.168 
(iv) Prisoners of war must be incarcerated only in detention centres situated on land.169 
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(v) The standard and condition of detention centres must be equal to those provided for the 
forces of the Detaining Power and consideration must be given to the cultures and 
religion of the prisoners of war.170 
(vi) Prisoners of war must have access to medical care.171  
(vii) The freedom of prisoners of war to exercise their religion must not be impeded.172 
 
International Law makes a clear distinction between persons taking part in an international 
armed conflict as either combatants or civilians and this distinction determines the 
international legal status of these two categories.173 By defining combatants as “all persons 
who may take direct part in hostilities”, the legal definition of combatants contained in 
Protocol I174 is repeated.175 It is therefore clear that a combatant is a person who fights, and 
that as an international legal term, the combatant is a person who is authorized by 
International Law to fight in accordance with the provisions applicable in international 
armed conflicts.176   
 
It is submitted that no ambiguity exists with regard to the provisions of Protocol I,177 which 
state that a soldier in a State’s armed forces is a combatant, who is entitled to engage in 
combat during armed conflicts.178 The combatant has permission to exert force, which may 
result in the death of enemy soldiers and the destruction of structures without the sanction of 
legal constraints hanging over him, which would normally be the case if he should act in this 
way during peacetime as an ordinary citizen.179 However, the lawful combatant is subject to 
International Law, and is not allowed to kill or destroy with impunity. There are specific 
rules in International Law, which determine how a combatant should wage war.180 
Combatants who contravene these rules do not forfeit their status as combatants, but can be 
held criminally responsible.181  
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An equally clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants can be found in 
Islamic Law. The instructions of the Prophet Muhammed regarding the non-combatant 
population, which include women, children, old people and the disabled, are unambiguous:  
“Do not kill any old person, any child or any woman. Do not kill the monks in monasteries 
and do not kill the people who are sitting in places of worship.”182 It is a cornerstone of the 
Islamic faith that non-combatants should not be victims during or after armed conflicts.183 
However, the reality of the situation, it is submitted, is that radical fundamentalist Islamic 
movements blatantly ignore the Prophet’s instructions. Movements such as Al Qaeda, 
Hamas, Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad, plan and execute indiscriminate armed attacks on 
civilians, killing anyone, including women, children, and the elderly, and then publicly take 
responsibility for their actions.  
 
Islam decrees further that during an armed conflict, all combatants on each side are accorded 
certain rights and duties which are:  
(i) Victors are not allowed to torture or burn vanquished combatants alive; 
(ii) Wounded combatants not actively involved in combat are not to be attacked; 
(iii) Prisoners of war should under no circumstances be executed; 
(iv) Combatants should abstain from executing any captured individual who is tied;184  
(v) Combatants are forbidden to plunder and destroy the adversary’s land. The explicit 
instructions to combatants were: “Do not destroy the villages and towns, do not spoil 
the cultivated fields and gardens, and do not slaughter the cattle.”  
(vi) Equipment, provisions taken from the adversary’s camps and military headquarters 
may be appropriated;185 
(vii) Combatants are forbidden to take anything belonging to civilians in the vanquished 
country, without remunerating the owner;186 
(viii) Fallen combatants from the opposing armed forces are not to be mutilated.187  
 
It is submitted that the violent acts committed by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 are in 
total contradiction to the teachings of Islam. Where Islam forbids the burning alive of 
adversaries in an armed conflict, Al Qaeda considers every American civilian and those who 
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align themselves with the United States, which include women, children and elderly people, 
as legitimate targets for their suicide bombers. The consequences of suicide bombings are 
the burning and mutilation of innocent civilians. Where Islam expressly prohibits the 
execution of captured individuals while they are tied, Al Qaeda launched a campaign of 
beheading hostages while they are bound. The graphic television images of Al Qaeda’s 
execution of a British hostage in Iraq are an example of how the teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammed are ignored. The Taliban forces, on the other hand, used civilians as human 
shields during the Afghanistan conflict to deter United States military attacks. 
 
Historically, there were fewer complexities in the recognition of combatants in regular 
armies than in the case of liberation fighters and irregular fighters.188 It was customary for 
earlier armies to wear attire that clearly distinguished them from civilians, but irregular and 
resistance fighters did not wear uniforms that could distinguish them from the civilian 
population.189 The absence of uniforms created uncertainty about whether members of 
irregular armies were deemed combatants or not.190  
 
The solution to the problem of recognizing combatants offered by the 1949 Conventions 
only affected the regular armies. It was only with the adoption of Additional Protocol I191 
that clear directives required parties to a conflict to ensure that their fighters were clearly 
distinguishable from the civilian population.192 Whereas the Geneva Conventions are only 
applicable to regular armies, the definitions given to “armed forces” and “combatant” by 
Additional Protocol I 193 dispense with the difference between a State’s armed forces and the 
armed forces of a liberation movement.194 In terms of the Protocol I provision the armed 
forces of a liberation movement are subject to express requirements, which are:  
i. “A measure of organization”;  
ii. “A responsible command”; and  
iii. “An internal disciplinary system” to ensure adherence to all the rules of armed 
conflict.195  
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Individual members of the armed forces of liberation movements qualify as combatants and 
can lawfully engage in combat.196 In terms of the provisions of Additional Protocol I it is not 
required for armed force members to wear uniforms in order to be recognized as an armed 
force.197 However, Protocol I198 compels individual combatants to distinguish themselves 
from civilians when engaged in combat or when preparing to attack enemy lines. If the 
combatant is unable to distinguish himself from civilians, he will be able to retain his 
combatant status on condition that his weapons are visible during every military operation as 
well as when he is in sight of the enemy when deployed in preparation for an attack.199 
Failure to fulfill these requirements will lead to the combatant not being accorded the rights 
normally associated with prisoner of war status.200  
 
The laws of war further determine that any privately appointed combatant or army does not 
have any right to engage in military operations. However, such individuals can engage in 
combat levee en masse with an advancing enemy if they adhere to the laws and customs of 
war,201 but their rights to engage as combatants cease the moment the enemy forces are in 
control of the disputed territory. The Al Qaeda organization appears to be a private army 
with no mandate from any State to engage in military operations on its behalf. It is therefore 
clear that Al Qaeda is operating outside the existing precepts of International Law.   
 
Lawful combatants captured by opposing armed forces are as a matter of cause accorded 
prisoner of war status. However, spies and mercenaries are notable exceptions to this general 
rule. These exceptions prove that certain captured individuals may not meet the requirements 
to be accorded prisoner of war status.202 An individual, who is not a combatant, who 
engages in combat with enemy forces during an armed conflict, is prohibited from claiming 
combatant privileges and is individually responsible for his actions.203 Such an individual, 
who is not authorized to take a direct part in hostilities but nevertheless does, is labeled as an 
“unlawful combatant”. Unlawful combatants are legitimate targets of attack while engaging 
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combat.204 If, after a fair trial, an unlawful combatant is convicted of a crime committed 
during an armed conflict, the capturing party may impose punishment by means of any 
lawful methods available. 
 
Neither The Hague205 nor Geneva Conventions206 define the term “unlawful combatant”, 
although, historically, it was a legally accepted term. Uncertainty continues to surround the 
definition of the term as far as International Law is concerned. In a war zone only two 
combating groups are identified by International Law, namely: 
(i) Individuals which include soldiers, combatants in the armed forces and militias who 
are lawful combatants; and 
(ii) Lawful combatants who forfeit their rights to be afforded prisoner of war status when 
captured by enemy forces.207 
 
The Third Geneva Convention determines that in order for an organization’s members active 
in an armed conflict to qualify as lawful combatants, the organization’s members are 
compelled to fulfill four requirements208 (which will be dealt with in the following chapter). 
Failure to do so, would render individual members unlawful combatants, who will not be 
accorded the protection of the Third Geneva Convention. In failing to meet the requirements, 
the unlawful combatant is at risk not only of being detained, but also of being subjected to 
interrogation and trial by military tribunal209 for engaging in impermissible hostile acts 
during an armed conflict.  These “unlawful combatants” are not guaranteed protection 
against “physical coercion and intensive interrogation”; they are exposed to “unmediated 
and unsupervised interrogation”.210 The Guantanamo Bay detainees are labeled as “unlawful 
combatants” and are denied their rights in terms of Article 5 of the Third Geneva 
Convention. They are further subjected to intensive interrogation with reports of torture 
appearing regularly in major United States newspapers.  
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Initially the United States considered the Guantanamo Bay detainees to be prisoners of war 
(and thus subject to the laws of war). Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United 
States Administration unilaterally determined that captured Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, 
who fail to meet the requirements of the Third Geneva Convention, are unlawful 
combatants. It appears that by declaring the detainees unlawful combatants, the United 
States Administration is effectively saying that the Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not 
entitled to the protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions such as immunity from 
prosecution for lawful acts of war. 
 
 The United States’ declaration elicited widespread criticism and allegations of violations of 
International Law. Legal opinion holds that the term “unlawful combatant”, or “illegal 
enemy combatant”, is completely foreign to United States Criminal Law, International Law 
and the laws of war. Therefore, the reason for its use is to withhold the right to legal 
representation and the right to a speedy trial from the detained combatant, a move which is 
perceived to be an unacceptable and arbitrary suspension of the rule of law. The fact that no 
vacuum exists between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions means that there is no 
such entity as an unlawful combatant.211  
 
In order to justify their revocation of prisoner of war status for the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees, new descriptive categories were created for these detainees, the use of which 
absolved United States Administration from any legal obligations.212 A further manoeuvre 
by the United States government was to issue a draft document titled “Joint Doctrine for 
Detainee Operations: Joint Publication 3-63”,213 which created a new category of detainee, 
thereby formalizing the “enemy combatant” category. Armed force members who are denied 
prisoner of war status are, in terms of the JP 3-63, designated as “enemy combatants”. The 
JP 3-63 is, however, not limited to Al Qaeda and Taliban members, but to any individual 
whom the United States is engaged with in the war on terror. The JP 3-63 determines further 
that any detained individual with ties to a terrorist organization is to be classified as an 
enemy combatant.  
 
                                                 
211  [online] available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki (accessed on 13 February, 2006). 
212  Wilke “War v Justice: Terrorism Cases, Enemy Combatants, and Political Justice in United States  
 Courts” PhD candidate New School for Social Research New York 32.  
213  Hereinafter called JP 3-63. 
30 
 
The United States Government’s strategy of re-classifying the Guantanamo Bay detainees 
has elicited widespread criticism. Firstly, the JP 3-63 is criticized for not setting criteria on 
how to identify organizations or individuals as terrorist entities. Furthermore, by issuing the 
JP 3-63 document, the United States government condoned the unlawful action by the 
Defence Department of ignoring the provisions in the Geneva Conventions that deal with 
prisoners of war and protected persons214.  
 
The untenable situation that obtains on Guantanamo Bay can be ascribed to the lack of 
clarity about the categories “illegal combatants”, “enemy combatants” and “unlawful 
combatants”. This lack of a clear definition effectively positioned the detainees “outside the 
law and beyond justice”). Pictet, however, states that “[t] here is no intermediate status, 
nobody in enemy hands is outside the law… which is a satisfactory solution from the 
humanitarian point of view.”215     
 
Pictet’s point above is confirmed by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. In the event 
of a combatant failing to fulfill the Article 4216 requirements and if he is declared an 
unlawful combatant, he will nevertheless be protected in terms of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention with regard to his treatment and fair trial rights.217 Whenever there is doubt 
about whether an individual is a lawful combatant, that person must be held captive as a 
prisoner of war, pending status determination by a competent tribunal. If the tribunal, in its 
status determination, finds that the individual is an unlawful combatant that person’s status 
reverts back to that of a civilian, who in terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention, is 
guaranteed certain rights as a protected person.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the above it is submitted that the Guantanamo detainees should retain their 
civilian status and should, therefore, be eligible for protection under the United States 
Constitution. However, the capturing party to the conflict may limit these rights, if granting 
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such rights would prejudice the security of that State.218 It is, however, submitted that the 
granting of constitutional rights to the detainees would not prejudice State security for the 
following reasons: firstly, the detainees are incarcerated and, secondly, if sufficient evidence 
against them exists, they can be charged and tried in the civilian courts, where the State with 
its abundant resources is in a position to prove its case.   
 
The United States’ declaration that the captured Al Qaeda and Taliban combatants are 
unlawful combatants, created a new controversy regarding the Geneva Conventions. The 
official United States policy is that the detainees do not fulfill the requirements, in terms of 
the Third Convention, to be regarded as lawful combatants. They are therefore labeled as 
unlawful combatants who should be denied the status and protections usually accorded to 
prisoners of war. The United States Administration is furthermore of the opinion that these 
unlawful combatants cannot be dealt with in terms of United States Criminal Law, which is 
perceived to be inadequate to deal with this category of offender. Therefore, the United 
States will not treat the Guantanamo detainees as common criminals.219     
 
The opinion that the detainees do not fulfill the requirements of the Third Convention is 
shared by various commentators. They believe that “the detainees are not being labeled as 
prisoners of war, because they did not engage in warfare according to the precepts of the 
Geneva Conventions; they hide their weapons, do not wear uniforms, and try to blur the line 
between combatant and non-combatant”.220 It is submitted that in view of the above 
comments, the detainees, by their actions and the fact that they did not adhere to the 
requirements as set out in the Third Geneva Convention, determined their own status. The 
requirements, which need to be met to acquire prisoner of war status, will be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter.      
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 4(A)(2) OF THE THIRD 
GENEVA CONVENTION TO THE GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The status of the captured Guantanamo Bay detainees has become a controversial public 
debate with no unified resolve in the current international climate. William Winthrop,221 an 
American lawyer, commented as follows regarding the status of prisoners of war: “Modern 
sentiment and usage have induced in the practice of war few changes so marked as that 
which affects the status of prisoners of war.”  
 
The status of prisoners of war, as defined by International Humanitarian Law, is determined 
by the nature of the conflict they were party to. For instance: 
(i) Humanitarian Law as embodied in the four Geneva Conventions and Protocol I of 1977 
is applicable if the detainees were taken captive during an international armed conflict; 
(ii)  International Humanitarian Law embodied in common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II is applicable if the detainees were captured 
during a non-international armed conflict; 
(iii)  International Humanitarian Law is not applicable if the detainees were captured outside 
the context of an armed conflict.222   
Therefore, in order to determine the law applicable to the Guantanamo detainees at the time 
of capture, it has to be determined what type of armed conflict was being waged. 
  
The United States’ position is that the Afghanistan conflict was international in character in 
terms of Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions of 
1949 constitute a comprehensive legal regime governing the treatment of detainees in an 
armed conflict. The most important objective of the Conventions is to protect soldiers and 
civilians from the horrors of war and to implement the rules dealing with the treatment of 
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prisoners of war.223 It is submitted that the Afghanistan conflict was indeed international in 
character and that the Al Qaeda combatants captured during that conflict formed part of the 
Taliban forces, thus making them subject to the provisions of International Humanitarian 
Law.      
 
The Third Geneva Convention defines prisoners of war as members of armed forces 
captured during a conflict, or members of other militias and members of other volunteer 
corps, provided that such militias or volunteer corps fulfill the following requirements: 
(i) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(ii) That of having a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(iii) That of carrying arms openly; and 
(iv) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.224 
 
4.2 ENTITLEMENT TO PRISONER OF WAR STATUS 
 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention that deals with the status of prisoners of war, 
appears to be the most comprehensive and detailed Article in the Convention. It was at the 
Stockholm Conference in 1948 that the definition of prisoners of war was formulated as, 
“individuals who have fallen into the power of the enemy”. At the 1949 Conference this 
definition was drafted into the opening sentence of Article 4.225
 
In light of the importance of determining which individuals are entitled to prisoner of war 
status, it is both logical and imperative that Article 4 be discussed in a detailed, categorized 
manner in order to assess its applicability to the Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.226  
 
4.3 MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES  
 
The term “members of the armed forces” refers to all members of a nation’s regular armed 
forces. National law sets out the fundamental requirements that determine the armed forces 
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of a State.  When called up for active duty, the conscript, and the wartime volunteer, the 
reservist and the career soldier are all members of a State’s regular armed forces.227
 
The Third Geneva Convention grants prisoner of war status not only to “militias and 
volunteer corps”, but also to members of other militias and other volunteer corps and 
organized resistance movements if they complied with the four conditions set out in the 
Convention.228 These conditions are separately set out below and briefly discussed.  
 
The first condition is “That of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates.”229  This condition is open to interpretation. On the one hand, it may mean 
“responsible to some higher authority” or, on the other hand, “responsible to a commander” 
who orders individuals to carry out belligerent acts and expects them to comply with these 
orders.230 The ICRC’s interpretation of responsible leadership is that there should be “the 
guarantee of a certain order and a certain discipline ensuring respect for international law”, 
which would secure the utmost compliance with the laws and customs of war.231 It is also 
not clear how a captured member of an organized resistance movement will be able to 
convince the Occupying Power that he is entitled to prisoner of war status and that he is 
answerable to a responsible commander.232 To divulge the name of the resistance 
movement’s commander would mean the immediate extinction of the movement. It would 
be virtually impossible to comply with such a condition, as compliance would render future 
operations by the resistance movement practically non- existent.233 Nevertheless, to be 
accorded prisoner of war status, captured combatants must fulfill the above condition and 
subject themselves to the laws of war.  Failure to do so, would prevent them from obtaining 
prisoner of war status.234  
 
It is important, for the purpose of this treatise, to determine whether the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban combatants fulfill the requirement of “being commanded by a person responsible for 
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his subordinates.” The cell structure of the Al Qaeda network makes it difficult to prove that 
a chain of command existed in the organization, although Bin Laden, as the leader, may be 
seen as “a person responsible for his subordinates”.235 If the captured combatants were to be 
classified as members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, the classification may 
account for the Taliban despite the fact that Afghanistan was never recognized by the United 
States or the United Nations, but not the Al Qaeda detainees.236 An irregular militia such as 
Al Qaeda does not, in view of the above, meet the first requirement and is, therefore, not 
entitled to prisoner of war status.237 It is submitted that this contention may not be correct in 
light of the fact that Al Qaeda was actively involved with the Taliban in military operations 
against the United States Alliance during the Afghanistan conflict.     
 
In order to determine whether the Taliban detainees are entitled to prisoner of war status in 
terms of the Third Geneva Convention, one will have to establish whether they resemble a 
traditional army, which was commanded by a “person responsible for his subordinates” as 
required by the Third Convention,238 despite the fact that Afghanistan was never recognized 
by the United States or the United Nations.239   The captured Taliban combatants clearly 
fulfill the first condition.240  
 
If the Al Qaeda detainees can prove that they were part of the armed forces of Afghanistan, 
they would be entitled to prisoner of war status while failure to do so, would automatically 
disqualify them from obtaining that status.241 The contention that Al Qaeda does not fulfill 
the first requirement, does not take into consideration the existence of the 005 Brigade, 
which was the guerilla arm of the Al Qaeda network.242 The 005 Brigade has been combined 
with, and absorbed into, the armed forces of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with the 
objective of assisting the Taliban forces in the fight against the Northern Alliance. The 005 
Brigade operated as the shock troops of the Taliban forces and functioned as an integral part 
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of the latter’s military apparatus.243 It is, therefore, submitted that the Al Qaeda detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay were captured during the armed conflict in Afghanistan and, as members 
of the 005 Brigade, they were part of the Taliban armed forces, a party to the armed conflict. 
This clearly proves that the Al Qaeda detainees fulfill the first requirement.  
  
The second condition is “That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance.”244 The rationale behind this condition was, firstly, to protect members of the 
armed forces of the Occupying Power from treacherous attacks by apparently harmless 
individuals245 and, secondly, to protect innocent, truly non-combatant civilians from 
suffering when the actual perpetrators of a belligerent act seek to escape identification and 
capture by merging into the general population.”246
 
The question is raised as to what interpretation should be attached to the words “fixed 
distinctive sign” and whether the sign should be attached or just tied to an arm. The ICRC 
itself did not have much success in its interpretation of the term.247 Nevertheless, a clear 
interpretation is imperative for a distinction between the combatant and the civilian. 
Therefore it is important that, for its interpretation to be meaningful, the requirement of a 
fixed distinctive sign has to be interpreted as meaning “fixed” and “distinctive”.248 When 
fixed, it must not be possible to remove the fixed distinctive sign at the first signs of danger; 
therefore a rag or handkerchief does not fulfill this requirement.249 In most armies, military 
regulations stipulate how uniforms and insignia are to be worn. However, in a changing 
world the rules of armed conflict could not remain unchanged.250 The requirement of a 
“fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance” was relaxed with the adoption of Protocol 
I.251  
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For soldiers engaged in physical combat, there is nothing more important than being able to 
identify whom one’s allies and enemies are.252 This is not necessarily the case in conflicts 
where the parties are unequal. A party that is weak and poorly equipped will have no interest 
in uniforms or distinctive signs.253 This was and still is the reality faced by resistance 
movements in Africa, Asia and South America, who do not have the resources that 
governments have. A notable exception is the ANC’s armed struggle, which was supported 
by the international community.  
 
The foregoing, notwithstanding, commentators are agreed that no ambiguities exist and that 
the most important factor in terms of Humanitarian Law is that there must be a clear 
separation between combatants and civilians.254 Official United States policy upholds 
Humanitarian Law in this regard. The United States Air Pamphlet determines that a uniform 
guarantees the identification of combatants, but that “less than a complete uniform will 
suffice, provided it serves to distinguish combatants from civilians.” It would appear, 
therefore, that the identification of a particular group is not the sole purpose of the fixed 
distinctive sign, but rather the separation between soldiers and civilians and a uniform serves 
that purpose.255  
 
The issue, however, of what constitutes a distinctive sign is still clouded with uncertainty as 
it has not been defined. Therefore, claims that an armband or beret is accepted as 
conforming to the requirements of a distinctive sign may not be correct because it would not 
fulfill the requirement that the sign must be fixed.256
 
The additional requirement of this condition that the sign must be “recognizable at a 
distance”257 has also been criticized. For instance, in 1924 Fooks commented on this 
requirement as follows: “The distance at which the sign must be distinguishable is vague and 
undetermined.”258 The ICRC attempted to clarify this requirement by stating that the sign 
must be “recognizable at a distance by analogy with uniforms of the regular army.” The 
reality is that very few combatants belonging to resistance groups have worn distinctive 
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signs comparable to that of regular armed forces. They could not, in most instances, when 
they were involved in an armed conflict, be compelled to wear it.259 Lauterpacht expands on 
the viewpoint of the ICRC by stating: 
 
“It is reasonable to expect that the silhouette of an irregular combatant standing against the skyline 
should be at once distinguishable from that of a peaceful inhabitant by the naked eye of ordinary 
individuals, at a distance at which the form of an individual can be determined.”260
 
One criticism against the requirement set by the ICRC and Lauterpacht is that it is more 
difficult for resistance groups to meet the requirements of having a fixed sign and being 
recognizable at a distance.261 Another viewpoint is that the requirement does not conform to 
traditional military strategies of avoiding being detected or an easy target. Therefore, the 
identification of combatants from civilians cannot be based solely on the fact that the 
combatant is wearing a uniform or distinctive sign recognizable from a distance.262 In the 
light of the above, it is submitted that the distinction can also be derived from the weapons 
the combatants are using as long as the said weapons are not concealed.  
 
The distinction between combatants and civilians lies at the very core of International 
Humanitarian Law, and therefore forms the basis of the laws and customs of war.263 The 
definition for this principle is found in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 
which states: 
 
“In order to ensure respect for and protection for the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties 
to a conflict are required at all times to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly must conduct their operations only 
against military objectives.”264
 
International Humanitarian Law does not compel armies to wear uniform, but the practice of 
wearing it is generally accepted by States. In terms of International Humanitarian Law, 
States must legislate the wearing of uniform in their domestic law.265 During the 
                                                 
259  Levie 48.  
260  Lauterpacht-Oppenheim as quoted in Levie 48. 
261   Levie 48.  
262   Pfanner 108. 
263   Pfanner 104. 
264   Article 48 of Additional Protocol I.   
265   Pfanner 104. 
39 
 
Afghanistan conflict the Taliban and Northern Alliance forces did not wear traditional 
uniform.266 It is therefore submitted that the Al Qaeda combatant, active in the Taliban 
forces as a member of Al Qaeda’s 005 Brigade, was for all intents and purposes part of the 
Taliban forces, who did not wear uniform.  
 
Given the composite nature of their military forces, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance 
could not fulfill the “fixed distinctive sign” stipulation, and unless these combatants depicted 
themselves as civilians, they cannot, if captured, be denied prisoner of war status. Their 
rights are determined by the kind of combat they were engaged in and not by their 
nationality or their attire during an armed conflict.267   
 
During the Afghanistan conflict, the black turban of the Taliban forces was not recognized 
as a distinctive sign by the United States Government.268 Their reasoning was that the 
Taliban did not wear uniform and neither did they display a distinctive sign to distinguish 
themselves from civilians.269  In so far as the Taliban and Northern Alliance forces wore 
dark turbans and scarves respectively, one can assume that they recognized each other. 
Distinguishing themselves from civilians would, therefore, not have presented a problem. If 
the Taliban and Northern Alliance forces could recognize each other, it stands to reason that 
the United States forces should have been able to do the same. 270 For this reason, the United 
States’ contention that the Taliban did not distinguish themselves, is flawed. 
 
Contrary to their position on the Taliban, as discussed above, the United States appears to 
justify the use of traditional attire by their Special Forces in order for them to blend in with 
the locals and to infiltrate enemy forces, in conflicts where irregular forces, who do not wear 
any uniform, have to be able to identify each other.271 When captured, it is not required of 
these members of the armed forces to have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance. 
In terms of International Law the importance of this requirement is centred on recognizing 
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the difference between belligerents and peaceful citizens.272 For members of an armed group 
fighting secretly against an occupying force, a distinctive sign takes the place of a uniform. 
Therefore it should be worn continuously to demonstrate the wearer’s loyalty.273   
 
The third condition is “That of carrying arms openly.”274 This condition poses the least 
difficulty for compliance. Weapons concealed by clothes do not conform with the 
requirement, whereas carrying a rifle or machine gun openly does.275 The aim of this 
provision is to limit the concealment of weapons. There should be no uncertainty regarding 
the carrying of weapons openly and visibly. Because the element of surprise plays an 
important role in armed conflict, the intention of this provision is to assure the fairness of the 
fighting. Opposing parties to a conflict must be in a position to recognize their adversaries, 
whatever their weapons. It would be treacherous for a civilian to gain entry into the enemy’s 
military post by posing as a non-combatant, and then open fire on the unsuspecting enemy 
soldiers.276 It is submitted that the ways in which resistance movements conducted their 
armed struggles did not conform to the requirements of International Law. The art of 
confusing the enemy and preventing detection when carrying out military operations 
determined success or failure for the resistance movements. It is submitted that the manner 
in which they were operating was justified in view of the vast difference in access to 
finances and resources between the resistance movements and the governments they were 
opposing.     
 
The conditions of carrying arms openly and wearing a distinctive sign serve the same 
purpose, namely to distinguish combatants from civilians. The reality, however, is that 
regular armed force members do not always carry weapons, and that the weapons, if carried, 
may not be seen from a close distance.  On the other hand, the carrying of arms is not a 
requirement for participation in an armed conflict, because to deliver arms and ammunition 
to combatants may be construed as taking part in the hostilities.277   
 
It is submitted that during the Afghanistan conflict, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, the Northern 
Alliance, and its ally the United States, waged an armed conflict that covered vast areas of 
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that country and opposed each other openly, with weapons clearly exposed.  There should, 
therefore, be no doubt that the combatants of Al Qaeda’s 005 Brigade and the Taliban forces 
complied with the condition of carrying arms openly. In contrast, the covert operations of the 
United States Special Forces require the concealment of weapons, which is a direct violation 
of the requirement.   
 
The fourth and final condition is “That of conducting their operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war.”278 Commentators are agreed that parties engaged in armed 
conflict must subject themselves to the laws of war, and that no party can claim its 
protection if they openly violate the restraints and prohibitions embodied in the laws of 
war.279 According to one school of thought, there is no ambiguity surrounding the equal 
application of the laws of war to anyone claiming to be a combatant.280 Compliance with the 
laws of war is imperative and should apply also to organized resistance movements and 
irregular forces. However, it should be taken into consideration that it would be difficult for 
guerrilla forces to meet all the requirements of Humanitarian Law in view of the nature of 
irregular combat.281 Nevertheless, if organized resistance movements do not maintain the 
standard of compliance, non-compliance with the other requirements could become the order 
of the day.282 Furthermore, upholding a different standard in the application of the laws of 
war with regard to irregular forces would severely diminish its equal application.283  
 
Regarding organized resistance movements, it should be borne in mind that, “[i]nasmuch as 
compliance with all four conditions is ‘constitutive’ in nature, the failure of the organized 
resistance movement as a whole to meet the fourth condition makes it impossible for any of 
its members to qualify for prisoner of war status.”284 It is therefore submitted that in view of 
the inability of resistance movements to comply with all four conditions it would be 
reasonable and fair that only the conditions of carrying arms openly and conducting military 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war, should be applicable to 
organized resistance movements, in order to make it possible for them to be accorded 
prisoner of war status.   
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 The limitations placed on the terrorist operations of the Al Qaeda network after September 
11, 2001 have driven the organization to exhort other radical Islamists groups to embark on 
“mass casualty terrorism”. This clearly demonstrates that Al Qaeda does not and will not 
abide by the customary laws of war.285  A further indication is the nature of the Al Qaeda 
attacks, which are focused on killing innocent civilians through a “publicly acknowledged 
terror campaign.”286 It is submitted that the Guantanamo Bay detainees captured during the 
Afghanistan conflict should be protected in terms of International Law, and that the Al 
Qaeda operatives who blatantly fail to adhere to the laws and customs of war, and who 
engage in terror campaigns against civilians, should not receive the protection of the Geneva 
Conventions.  
 
There appears to be uncertainty as to whether the burden of proof rests with the individual, 
irregular captive to prove that his group, when executing their operations, adhered to the 
laws and customs of war. If it is left to the individual and he fails to discharge that burden, it 
will be open to abuse by Detaining Powers, who may deem all members of such a group to 
be unprivileged combatants. It is submitted that the discharge of this burden is exactly what 
the United States Government requires of each individual detainee at Guantanamo Bay, 
whereas regular armed force members are not expected to furnish proof of compliance with 
the laws of war.287
 
The internationalization of the Afghanistan conflict was brought about through United States 
armed intervention against the Taliban, which fulfilled the requirement set by the 1949 
Conventions.288 It is therefore submitted that, in view of the fact that both the United States 
and Afghanistan are signatories to the Geneva Conventions, both parties are subject to the 
provisions and requirements of the laws and customs of war. Following a protracted silence 
regarding their interpretation of the 1949 Conventions, the United States indicated that 
although they were committed to the provisions of the Third Convention, they held the view 
that “the war on terrorism is a war not envisioned when the Geneva Conventions were 
signed in 1949.” Therefore, the United States adopted the position that in this war on terror 
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the Third Convention simply does not cover every situation in which people may be 
captured or detained in Afghanistan today.289  
 
Although Afghanistan is not recognized as a Sovereign State by the United States, the latter 
accepts Afghanistan as a signatory to the Geneva Conventions and, therefore, the Taliban’s 
armed forces should be covered by the Conventions.290 The fact that the United States 
recognizes Afghanistan as a signatory, confirms the United States’ tacit acknowledgement of 
the international status of the Afghanistan conflict.291 It is submitted that all parties to the 
conflict are subject to the laws of war, which includes all Al Qaeda operatives captured 
during the conflict and held at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere in the world.    
 
The Taliban’s open support of Al Qaeda in the latter’s unlawful terrorist operations moved 
the United States to determine that the Taliban did not fulfill the requirements of the Third 
Convention,292 which are prerequisites for regular armed force members if they are to be 
accorded prisoner of war status.293 The United States did not find the Taliban compliant with 
the legal requirements and thus refused to accede to the Taliban receiving prisoner of war 
status.294 The United States’ position, it is submitted, is criticized with good reason. The 
reason for the criticism is that the adversaries of the United States can rightfully demand the 
same compliance from United States combatants. The adversary might refuse prisoner of 
war status to all captured United States members active in hostilities, if compliance with the 
four conditions were imperative for the granting of prisoner of war status to regular armed 
force personnel who are guilty of committing war crimes.295
 
It is submitted that the United States’ position creates and untenable situation, which may 
result in innocent combatants on the southern border of Afghanistan being held responsible 
for war crimes committed by an individual stationed on the eastern border of the country. 
Other warring countries may adopt this unhealthy stance, which does not augur well for 
combatants captured in armed conflicts all over the world. In terms of policy and law the 
United States’ position on this issue appears to be flawed. It would have been consistent with 
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existing law and practice if the Taliban armed forces were unconditionally accorded prisoner 
of war status. Such an action would not have prevented the United States from eliciting 
information from the Taliban detainees or from instituting prosecution for crimes committed 
prior to or related to September 11, 2001.296
 
The United States’ view that Al Qaeda is an international terrorist organization which cannot 
legally ratify the 1949 Conventions may be correct, because at no stage prior to or after 
September 11, did any State mandate Al Qaeda to launch armed attacks on the United 
States.297 It is therefore submitted that Al Qaeda is, except for their part in the Afghanistan 
conflict, not part of the armed forces of any State, but rather an organization, which executed 
its own private, hostile agenda against the United States, resulting in every member of Al 
Qaeda being liable to punishment in the event of capture. The Guantanamo Bay detainees 
should, therefore, be accorded prisoner of war status in terms of International Humanitarian 
Law. 
 
4.4 THE DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF THE GUANTANAMO BAY 
DETAINEES: ARTICLE 5 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION  
 
As mentioned above earlier, the United States’ declaration that the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees are unlawful combatants and not prisoners of war, has elicited an international 
debate about the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention that deal with the issue of 
prisoner of war status. The United States Government’s intransigence in according prisoner 
of war status to Al Qaeda and Taliban combatants is questionable and clearly does not 
comply with the Third Geneva Convention.298 This position adopted by the United States is 
indicative of their belief that the status of the captured combatants was never in doubt, thus 
obviating the need for status determination in terms of Article 5.299 The Convention states 
clearly that “should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent 
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories 
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention 
until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal”.300 Any 
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combatant active in the hostilities when taken captive is presumed a prisoner of war, and, 
until his status has been determined, should be treated as a prisoner of war.301 The United 
States has, however, never attempted to determine the status of the detainees by way of a 
tribunal.302  
 
The attitude of the United States is disconcerting in view of the fact that the Vietnam and 
Gulf War conflicts saw the operation of such tribunals by the United States armed forces. 
These tribunals succeeded in verifying the status of significant numbers of civilian detainees 
in the Gulf War.303 In the case of the Afghanistan conflict, the United States’ Colin 
Powell304 preferred status determination by a military judge, which was not accepted. His 
concern was that failure to apply the Third Convention would put the future safety of United 
States soldiers at risk. The reality facing the United States, it is submitted, is that not only are 
United States soldiers at risk, but so is every United States citizen captured by Al Qaeda 
operatives. 
 
It is submitted that the United States’ policy of circumventing status tribunals clearly 
demonstrates a blatant disregard for and violation of International Law.  If the captive has 
been refused prisoner of war status and is suspected of having committed an offence during 
the hostilities, he should be allowed to claim his right to prisoner of war status and demand 
that a judicial tribunal deal with his claim.305 Status determination has to be concluded 
before the onset of a military hearing regarding the offence. This avoids wrongful 
prosecution of captives whose offences are decriminalized when they are awarded prisoner 
of war status.306  
 
The intention of securing minimum protection for individuals acting on their own in an 
armed conflict led the ICRC to submit proposals which resulted in the adoption of Article 5 
of the Third Geneva Convention.307 The Diplomatic Conference expressed the view that 
captured combatants are at their most vulnerable when taken captive, because their situation 
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is determined by decisions regarding their status, which is not very clear at the time of 
capture.308 The importance of determining the status of captured combatants becomes 
paramount when it is considered that the daily welfare of prisoners of war is dependent on 
their status. Therefore the 1949 Conference agreed that the provisions of Article 5 should 
apply with immediate effect upon capture. Exception to this decision was discouraged. 
However, it is accepted that difficulties are experienced at the time of capture and that 
prisoners of war are, for a certain period of time, denied the rights they are entitled to.309
 
The ICRC later concluded that Article 5 of the Third Convention did not guarantee sufficient 
protection. Therefore, to limit the “categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war status”, 
and to curb the disagreements which would follow from the qualification for such status, 
Article 45 was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference in 1977, where it was accepted that 
the nature of modern warfare demanded that procedures be established to guarantee the 
granting of prisoner of war status to captives entitled to it. Consensus was reached that the 
procedures were important to save the humanitarian cause. The reason was that any 
combatant who commits a hostile act while not part of any armed force recognized by the 
adversary, risk being punished severely by the latter, and may even be sentenced to death.310  
 
The Third Convention specifies that a “competent tribunal” should adjudicate the process of 
status determination. The reasoning was that decisions regarding a captive’s status should 
not be placed in the hands of one low ranking individual, but that a court should rather deal 
with such matters because the possible sentences that could be handed down included capital 
punishment.311 The possibility exists that tribunals may not be able to eliminate all of the 
doubts regarding the captured combatant’s status. Lingering doubt may be created by the 
circumstances surrounding the individual’s entitlement to prisoner of war status, or the status 
of the armed forces he aligns himself with. However, no uncertainty should exist that, where 
an individual is captured and is not considered either a prisoner of war or a civilian who has 
not participated in hostilities, he should there and then be treated as a prisoner of war until 
such time that his status determination has been concluded by a competent tribunal.312   
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A combatant, furthermore, retains his status when captured, irrespective of whether he has 
violated the law of armed conflict.313 However, the law of armed conflict is applicable 
without exception to the armed forces the combatant was aligned to. Therefore, if it is 
established that the armed forces the combatant belonged to did not subject themselves to the 
laws of war, the status of the sentenced combatant would be in doubt even though he 
fulfilled the requirements expected of him.314 A competent tribunal would, therefore, be 
required to determine his status in terms of the Third Geneva Convention.315 The tribunal 
does not have to be a court, but the Detaining Power should determine its nature.316  
 
It is submitted that the correct forum for determining the status of the Guantanamo detainees 
would be a competent tribunal and not the United States Government, because of the 
presumption created by the Third Convention. United States military manuals and the fact 
that tribunals were established in the past, support the Article 5 procedure for status 
determination, provided for in the Convention.317 The United States Army Field Manual 
states that the Convention “applies to any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner of 
war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in aid of the armed forces and 
who asserts he is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war or concerning whom any other 
doubt of like nature exist.”318  
 
The United States Air Pamphlet determines that “[u]pon capture, any person, who does not 
appear to be entitled to prisoner of war status, but who had committed a belligerent act is 
required to be treated as a prisoner of war until his status is properly determined.”319 The 
need to have a formalized procedure to deal with cases where doubt existed was realized by 
the United States Army in 1966 already. The directives, which were issued then, were 
“probably the first one[s] issued by any armed forces fully implementing the provisions of 
the second paragraph of Article 5.”320 The use of status determining tribunals where there is 
doubt is basically non-negotiable. The United States Military Judge Advocate General 
Handbook states that “when doubt exists as to whether captured enemy personnel warrant 
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prisoner of war status, Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention tribunals must be 
convened.”  
 
The United States’ refusal to accord prisoner of war status to the Al Qaeda and Taliban 
combatants drew scathing criticism, which was reflected in the following statement by the 
ICRC:  
 
“International Humanitarian Law foresees that the members of armed forces as well as militias 
associated with them which are captured by the adversary in an international armed conflict are 
protected by the Third Geneva Convention. There are divergent views between the United States and the 
ICRC on the procedures which apply on how to determine that the persons detained are not entitled to 
prisoner of war status.” 321                        
 
Procedural status determination is considered to be more just and impartial than a conclusive 
pronouncement by the executive branch. The implementation of competent tribunals to 
determine the status of the detainees would, therefore, have curtailed the criticism leveled 
against the United States. It is submitted that the implementation of such status 
determination procedures would have been in compliance with the prescripts of International 
Law, and although the Al Qaeda and Taliban combatants have not been accorded prisoner of 
war status, they are protected in terms of specific basic rules of international human rights 
and Humanitarian Law. 
 
The attitude of the United States Government regarding tribunals is not understandable in 
view of the sentiments voiced by some United States officials. The principle that there is no 
intermediate status and that a captured individual cannot fall outside the law, is embraced by 
officials in the United States government. Michael Matheson, a former Deputy Legal 
Advisor, affirmed that the United States agrees with the position that the Article 5 procedure 
for status determination is the correct one.  
 
In 1997 the United States armed forces formulated procedures to constitute status 
determination tribunals in terms of the Third Geneva Convention. These procedures outline 
the rules that should be adhered to when there is doubt concerning a captured individual’s 
status. The rules stipulate that captured individuals should:  
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(i) be informed of their rights at the commencement of proceedings against them,  
(ii) be allowed to be present at all open sessions of the proceedings,  
(iii) have the proceedings interpreted if necessary,  
(iv) be allowed to call witnesses and cross examine those witnesses called by the 
tribunal,  
(v) have the right to state their case,  
(vi) have the right to address the tribunal and,  
(vii) be able to exercise their right to silence.322  
 
It is submitted that the United States’ position clearly does not conform to the Geneva 
Conventions for a number of reasons. Firstly, the United States has no authority to 
unilaterally declare that all detainees captured during the Afghanistan conflict are not 
prisoners of war. By doing that, the United States is usurping the function of the tribunals 
provided for in the Third Geneva Convention. Secondly, the United States ignores the 
presumption that all combatants captured during an armed conflict are prisoners of war until 
proper status determination by a competent tribunal takes place. The assertion by the United 
States Government that the Geneva Conventions only protect lawful prisoners of war is not 
correct, because all combatants captured during an armed conflict are guaranteed some 
protection in terms of the Conventions. Finally, the United States’ attitude that the 
provisions of the Conventions are not applicable to the global war on terror creates the 
perception that the United States is deliberately violating the Conventions, and by doing so 
wants to determine its own rules for status determination and protection of battlefield 
detainees, parallel to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. In the process of 
contravening the Conventions, the United States compromises important international 
standards which could hamper efforts to sensitize its armed forces to the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions.  
 
Following the proper status determination of captured combatants, it is the responsibility of 
the Detaining Power to ensure the proper treatment of the captured combatants. The next 
section will provide an overview of the law applicable to the protection of the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees.   
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4.5 THE HUMANE TREATMENT OF THE GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES 
  
The applicable Humanitarian Law protecting defenceless individuals during an armed 
conflict cannot be changed by individual States. It is binding and must be adhered to by all 
States.323 The Conventions and Additional Protocol I place a general obligation on armed 
forces to treat combatants and civilians in their custody humanely. These provisions 
expressly prohibit discrimination against captives based on “race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other 
status, or on any other similar criteria.”324 Section III of Additional Protocol I places 
significant emphasis on the absolute prohibition of subjecting captives to “torture of all 
kinds, whether physical or mental”. All four Geneva Conventions emphasize the express 
prohibition on the use of torture. There is no exception, whether in the interest of the State or 
the survival of the nation, which could justify the use thereof. Therefore, any individual or 
State that employs torture as a tool to extract information, may be committing a grave breach 
of the Conventions, which may lead to an indictment for a war crime.325
 
A number of Human Rights treaties have a bearing on the situation of the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees. The United States is a signatory to, amongst others, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights326 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.327 Human rights instruments make provision for the 
deviation from fundamental rights by States in certain circumstances. However, there are 
rights which are not subject to these provisions, whatever the emergency may be. One such 
right, which is enshrined in the ICCPR, is the right of captured individuals not to be 
subjected to torture, or the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.328  
 
The Convention on Torture defines torture and provides guidelines to be followed by States 
to prevent their officials and soldiers from carrying out acts of torture. The Convention states 
that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war, or a threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification 
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of torture.”329 It is submitted that an individual’s right not to be subjected to torture cannot 
be deviated from under any circumstances. Moreover, the United States, as a signatory to the 
Convention on Torture, the ICCPR and the Geneva Conventions, is compelled to adhere to 
the provisions of these international instruments, which prohibit the use of torture and ill 
treatment to extract information from captured individuals or for any other reason.  
 
The torture and inhumane treatment of captured individuals during an armed conflict 
constitute war crimes.330 Acts of this nature are grave breaches of the Conventions for which 
perpetrators, or those issuing the orders to carry out such acts and those who fail to prevent 
such acts, can be criminally charged for war crimes. These acts are subject to universal 
jurisdiction and perpetrators can be brought to justice in any country that is a signatory to the 
Conventions.331 Several reports of inhumane treatment of the Guantanamo Bay detainees 
such as violations of their personal dignity through humiliating and degrading treatment, 
have surfaced.332 The humane treatment of captured individuals during armed conflict is the 
fundamental theme that runs through all four Conventions.333 Therefore, when 
understanding the concept of humanity, one realizes that the Conventions set out the correct 
manner in which one individual should treat another individual in times of armed conflict.334
 
In view of the allegations of torture and inhumane treatment that are being visited on the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees, the issue of whether International Law is criminalized and 
whether the perpetrators of these acts will be held accountable, should be discussed. The 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda demonstrated 
that the world was moving in the direction of criminalizing International Law, and that the 
perpetrators of grave breaches335 of the Geneva Conventions would be held accountable.336  
 
It is submitted that the trial for war crimes of the former Liberian Head of State, Charles 
Taylor, in Sierra Leone, confirms that the criminalization of International Law is a reality. 
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More than sixty countries ratified the Rome Statute which created the International Criminal 
Court. In terms of its provisions, which came into force on 1 July 2002, perpetrators of war 
crimes can be charged, convicted and sentenced. It is further required that, for international 
conflicts, State parties must criminalize certain grave breaches in their domestic law and 
prosecute or extradite perpetrators.337 It is submitted that the enforcement of sanctions 
against the United States for committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
other International Law instruments will not be an easy task. The question arises as to which 
international organization or country should enforce the sanction. The problems that can be 
encountered are, firstly, that the United States did not ratify the Rome Statute and, secondly, 
that the United States is the biggest financial contributor to the United Nations, which is the 
only international organization which can possibly influence United States’ policy.  
 
It has become a growing concern that the detainees are being subjected to inhumane 
treatment by the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency,338 in violation of the provisions 
of International Law. There is a real concern that CIA operatives have been granted the 
liberty to apply coercive interrogation methods on the terror suspects. The general concern is 
that the United States Government is attempting to ensure that these operatives are not 
restricted by law in applying “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” on the detainees. The 
methods employed by these agents are not allowed in the United States or in any other 
military context.339 It is submitted that the United States is attempting to rewrite the 
definition of torture to condone interrogation methods that are not allowed in terms of the 
internationally accepted definition of torture. 
  
The belief that the CIA is not required to meet humane standards was contained in a 
document issued by the United States State Department on February 2, 2002. This document 
echoed the sentiments of a number of Administration lawyers, which was that, as far as the 
conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda is concerned, the Third Geneva Convention does not 
apply. CIA attorneys expressed the view that if the protections guaranteed by the Convention 
are applicable as a matter of policy, that this policy should not limit the CIA in its treatment 
of the detainees. The manner in which the CIA attorneys interpreted the State Department’s 
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memorandum was endorsed by the President of the United States on February 7, 2002, when 
he stated that “the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely 
and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent 
with the principles of Geneva.”340  
 
The aforementioned directive by the United States President clearly illustrates that the 
United States Government’s interprets International and domestic law relating to the 
interrogation of terror detainees on foreign soil by government agents, in a manner that 
exempts CIA agents. It is submitted that the United States, in its attempt to exempt CIA 
agents from being subjected to laws prohibiting the use of coercive interrogation methods, in 
contravention of the Geneva Conventions, creates the impression that the treatment of 
detained terrorist suspects is not regulated by any part of International Law. This practice is 
disconcerting and disturbing, because it is a known fact that the United States, together with 
other democracies, have in the past recognized and adhered to the rules of customary law 
that deal with the treatment of terrorist detainees. 
  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
There appears to be consensus among legal experts that parties to an armed conflict must 
observe the laws and customs of war. It is submitted that such observance would be in 
keeping with the spirit of Henry Dunant’s vision with the founding of the ICRC, which was 
to minimize the suffering of civilians caught in the crossfire during armed conflicts and also 
to address the situation of captured combatants, irrespective of their status. Although it may 
be argued that Al Qaeda and the Taliban did not adhere to the laws and customs of war, it 
would be consistent with the intention of Humanitarian Law and human rights law that the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees be accorded the rights enshrined in various International Law 
instruments.  
 
In view of the above it is clear that the United States of America is in breach of the Geneva 
Conventions with regard to the provisions dealing with, firstly, the correct legal procedure 
for the status determination of the Guantanamo Bay detainees, and, secondly, the provisions 
dealing with the humane treatment of the detainees. The United States of America is further 
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also in breach of a number of other International Law instruments such as the Additional 
Protocols, the ICCPR, and the Convention on Torture.    
 
In view of the provisions contained in the International Law instruments mentioned above, 
of which the United States is a signatory, the Guantanamo Bay detainees are entitled to 
exercise their right to have the legality of their incarceration tested in a court of law. The 
following chapter will deal in more detail with the detainees’ right to a fair trial in terms of 
the International Law instruments.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES AND THEIR TRIAL RIGHTS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“War is war, and it has never been the case that when you captured a combatant you have to give them a 
jury trial in your civil courts, I had a son on that battlefield and they were shooting at my son and I’m not 
about to give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial. I mean it’s crazy.”341  
                                                                                                                        Justice Antonin Scalia                        
 
The United States has been using Guantanamo Bay as a naval base for more than a century. 
Control over the area was established in terms of a lease342 obtained during the 1898 
Spanish-American War. After diplomatic discussions between Cuba and the United States the 
lease was re-affirmed in 1934.343 The Castro Administration, however, does not recognize 
the lease in light of the provisions of article 52 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which determines that leases obtained by force are not legitimate.     
 
The United States Government transferred the first “war on terror” detainees to Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba in 2002. Approximately five hundred detainees are currently being held without 
charge or trial and are denied their rights in terms of International Law. They find themselves 
in a legal black hole, with no access to any court, legal representative or family visits. 
Therefore any discussion regarding the trial rights of the detainees has to first establish the 
legal regime which applies at Guantanamo Bay.  
 
The United States maintains that United States domestic law does not apply in Guantanamo 
Bay. The detainees are not considered to be legal subjects because they are not on United 
States territory. Therefore, they have no legal standing in the United States domestic courts. 
In terms of the lease contract between the United States and Cuba, the former has control 
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over Cuban territory. The United States, however, claims that it is allowed to suspend United 
States law on Guantanamo Bay344 because the area is subject to Cuban sovereignty.345   
 
It is submitted that if the territory is subject to Cuban sovereignty, the detainees should be 
accorded the status of legal subjects in terms of Cuban law. If the detainees are charged for 
war crimes and the United States is reluctant to prosecute them in their domestic courts, they 
should hand them over to the Cuban authorities for prosecution in the latter’s domestic 
courts. The detainees could also be tried by the International Criminal Court.346 The I.C.C. is 
an independent, permanent court that tries persons accused of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The I.C.C.’s policy of complimentary jurisdiction makes provision 
for the prosecution of the Guantanamo detainees by this forum.347 However, the United 
States did not ratify the Rome Statute of the I.C.C., which makes such prosecution 
improbable. It is submitted that the United States, as a signatory to all four Geneva 
Conventions, is compelled to accord the detainees due process and a fair trial if they are 
charged for grave breaches.  This submission is supported by the finding of the United States 
Supreme Court that the detainees “have been imprisoned in territory over which the United 
States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.”348 This would imply that the detainees 
should be accorded due process in terms of the Fifth Amendment.349   
   
Several hundreds of the detainees incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay were captured during the 
Afghanistan conflict. They are not accorded prisoner of war or civilian status. Their 
constitutional rights are not respected and not one detainee has been given a fair trial. This is 
happening against the background of the United States being a signatory to the Geneva 
Conventions and the ICCPR, both of which determine the requirements for the fair trial of 
enemy combatants or any individual who has been deprived of his freedom. 
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5.2 THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
 
It would appear that the United States Administration’s application of justice has been rooted 
in controversy from the moment the first detainees arrived at Guantanamo Bay. The detainees 
arrived without the protection of International Law or the Geneva Conventions. Held outside 
the United States, the detainees are seemingly not protected by the United States Constitution 
and therefore not entitled to a trial by jury. The detainees are held without charge and denied 
their democratic and legal rights. There is no indication as to whether they will be charged 
before a proper court of law. Their incarceration can be indefinite in light of their current 
situation, a situation which is in violation of the Geneva Conventions, the ICCPR and the 
United States Constitution.  
 
The requirements of the right to a fair trial, as embodied in International Law instruments and 
the United States Constitution, are the following:  
(i) The right to be informed of the charges;  
(ii) The right to prepare and to present a defence;  
(iii) The right to be assisted by counsel;  
(iv) The right not be forced to confess;  
(v) The right to be tried without undue delay, and  
(vi) The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.350  
 
The Guantanamo Bay detainees are denied all of the aforementioned rights. It is submitted 
that, even if the detainees pose a threat to the world order, the United States is still required 
by law to respect the individual’s basic human rights, such as the right to a fair trial. The right 
to a fair trial is central to the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention.351 The Bush 
Administration endorsed the view that the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks 
should not be accorded the protection of the Bill of Rights. President Bush stated, “We must 
not let foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself”.352 It is submitted 
that this reasoning totally ignores the presumption of innocence, which clearly illustrates that 
the United States is not adhering to due process principles when they assume that the 
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detainees are guilty in the absence of their conviction by a properly constituted court. It 
would be inconceivable to have the detainees tried without recourse to the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment Rights, which are the pillars of American justice. 
 
Due process and a speedy trial are guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution, guaranteed protections that cover all persons and not only United 
States citizens. There is, however, a school of thought which contends that persons captured 
outside the United States should not be accorded the protection of the United States 
Constitution.353 This opinion supports The Military Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial 
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism354 issued by the President of the United 
States. The Military Order states that a detainee “shall not be privileged to seek any remedy, 
directly or indirectly, in any court of the United States”. It is submitted that this directive is a 
violation of the Constitution that the President of the United States is bound to uphold.     
 
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, The Military Order introduced a system of 
military commissions for the trial of individuals linked to terrorist related offences. These 
military commissions require a lesser burden of proof than domestic courts to secure 
convictions, and by declaring the detainees unlawful combatants, the United States opened 
the way for their trial by these military commissions. It is submitted that military commission 
proceedings against the suspected terrorists pose a challenge to the well established 
guarantees of due process, a cornerstone of the American Constitution and International Law, 
as informed by the provisions of the ICCPR and Geneva Conventions.  
 
Proponents for the use of military commissions rely on court decisions355 from the Second 
World War.356 These decisions demonstrate that during wars the courts are reluctant to lean 
towards the protection of civil liberties. However, these Second World War decisions clearly 
predate the decisions such as the equality of law in Brown vs Board of Education357 and the 
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right to counsel in Gideon vs Wainwright.358 These later decisions were followed by 
progressive developments with regard to due process and the right of access to the courts.359
 
Following the decisions cited above, the United States became a signatory to the Geneva 
Conventions and the ICCPR, thereby committing itself to the principle of fairness through an 
independent judiciary. The judiciary’s independence was illustrated in a court decision where 
the importance of due process was emphasized. In this case the United States Government 
argued that the trial should take place unfettered by the United States Constitution and 
without judicial review. The Court, however, concluded that:  
 
“…it is the first principle of American life, not only life at home but life abroad, that everything 
American public officials do is governed by, measured against, and must be authorized by the United 
States Constitution.” 360  
 
The Court decided that the accused should be accorded due process of the law. It is clear that 
if confronted by acts of terrorism, judges are capable of adhering to the principles of due 
process.361
  
The trial proceedings associated with military commissions created by the Presidential decree 
would not guarantee the protections usually granted to lawful prisoners of war.362 It is 
therefore submitted that United States domestic courts would be reluctant to sanction military 
commissions, but, as Resnik opines, judges are fallible when they have to challenge 
executive decisions. It is further submitted that it would be inconceivable to implement the 
military commissions as envisaged by The Military Order if the detainees are not accorded 
due process rights in terms of the United States Constitution. 
 
The introduction of military commissions at Guantanamo Bay demonstrates the United States 
Government’s views on the wide powers of the president during wartime. The Military 
Order, authorizing the military commissions to try Al Qaeda members, is a manifestation of 
the wide powers enjoyed by the president. However, no trial has taken place before these 
commissions yet. These commissions are not similar to courts martial, and do not conform to 
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the laws, Constitution and treaties of the United States. The commissions further allow the 
United States to define the crime and to select the prosecutor and judges. Detainees that 
appear before these commissions are denied access to legal representation and to the evidence 
against them. Any verdict by the commission can be reversed by the United States Secretary 
of Defence. These commissions will allow statements which were obtained by undue 
influence, thus perpetuating more injustice363      
 
It was pointed out earlier that trials by military commissions were made possible through the 
unprocedural assignation of unlawful combatant status to the Guantanamo detainees. This 
status determination might be superfluous if the intention of the Detaining Power is to 
prevent the combatants from taking up weapons again by detaining them indefinitely.364 In 
compliance with International Law, as per the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war 
must be repatriated at the end of hostilities.365 The conflict in Afghanistan has ended. 
Therefore all captured combatants should have been released and repatriated after the 
cessation of armed hostilities.366 Any unjustified delay in their repatriation constitutes a 
serious breach in terms of international law.367 It is submitted that the continued incarceration 
of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, approximately five years after the cessation of the 
conflict, places the United States of America squarely in breach of international law. It is 
submitted that, in view of the United States’ War on Terror, it is doubtful whether the 
detention of the Guantanamo Bay detainees will end. 
 
The act of designating someone as an unlawful combatant creates the possibility for the said 
combatant to test that status through a judicial review mechanism. It is submitted that a 
judicial review mechanism should conform to the precepts of the ICCPR and Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions. However, the president of the United States, through his much-
maligned Military Order, denies the Guantanamo Bay detainees access to American courts, 
contrary to International Law. Furthermore, it would be logical to try the detainees in the 
functioning civilian courts, or subject them to military jurisdiction but with full judicial 
guarantees in terms of The Third Geneva Convention.368   
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 The USA Patriot Act passed on October 26, 2001 did not specifically authorize military 
commissions or enemy combatant detentions. The Military Order did so.369 The Military 
Order further determined that “any individual who is not a citizen of the United States” is 
subject to its provisions.370 It is submitted that the unwillingness of the United States 
Administration to have the issue of prisoner of war status settled by an appropriate court or 
tribunal, is a clear indication of political and military interference in the judicial process.  
 
5.3 COURT PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE DETENTION OF ENEMY 
COMBATANTS 
 
The Guantanamo Bay detainees claim that they are being held unlawfully in contravention of 
both International Law and the United States Constitution. Their detention has been 
challenged in a number of habeas corpus proceedings. However, these matters focused 
mainly on the court’s jurisdiction to deal with the habeas corpus application. The writ of 
habeas corpus is an order that an imprisoned individual appear in a court in order to test the 
lawfulness of his incarceration. The application for the writ is usually filed by the captive or 
by someone else who objects to the detention of the captive.371  
 
The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus as described by the court is to protect individuals 
“against the erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty”.372 
The habeas corpus order safeguards the freedom of individuals against arbitrary and lawless 
state action. The United States courts have dealt with the issue of whether, in times of war, 
citizens or foreigners could apply for the writ of habeas corpus. Two aspects dealt with were 
of particular importance to the Guantanamo Bay detainees. Firstly, whether a federal district 
court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus and, secondly, whether petitions for 
habeas corpus were subject to judicial review in the event of the petitioners’ capture during 
an armed conflict.373
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In a Second World War case374 twenty-one German operatives were convicted by a military 
commission for hostile acts against the United States. The proceedings took place in China. 
The convictions were approved by the military after review and the Germans were repatriated 
in view of the German surrender. The prisoners argued that their detention violated the 
United States Constitution and the Third Geneva Convention. Their application for the writ 
of habeas corpus was dismissed by the United States district court, which held that it had no 
jurisdiction to deal with the application.375
 
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the rights and differences between citizens and 
aliens in times of war. The Court stated that in order to invest enemy aliens, resident, 
captured and imprisoned abroad, with standing to demand access to United States courts, it 
would have to find that a prisoner of the United States military authorities is constitutionally 
entitled to the writ, even though he  
(i) was an enemy alien;  
(ii) had never been or resided in the United States;  
(iii) was captured outside of United States territory and there held in military 
custody as a prisoner of war;  
(iv) was tried and convicted by a military commission sitting outside the United 
States;  
(v) was tried for offences against laws of war committed outside the United States;  
(vi) was at all times imprisoned outside the United States.376 
 
 
The Supreme Court refused to make such a finding. The Court reasoned that the presence of 
an alien in the United States, whether enemy or friendly, “implied protection” and that no 
such protection could be invoked under the circumstances presented because:   
 
“the prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United States exercised 
sovereignty and the scenes of their offence, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond 
the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.”377
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The Court also recognized that “[e]xecutive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and 
unhampered by litigation ha[d] been deemed, throughout our history, essential to wartime 
security.”378 That security, the Court noted, would be jeopardized if field commanders were 
called to account for their actions by their enemies in their own civil courts, thereby diverting 
attention from their military mission.379
 
In another United States Supreme Court case380 one of the accused contended that because he 
was a United States citizen he was protected from being held accountable for his unlawful 
belligerency. The Court ruled that:  
 
“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the 
consequences of belligerency, which is unlawful because it is in violation of the law of 
war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, 
and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy 
belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. Put another 
way, Haupt was charged with entering the United States as an enemy belligerent and 
unlawful belligerency [was] the gravamen of the offense of which he [was] accused.”381
 
5.4 THE GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES: CHALLENGING THE UNITED 
STATES AUTHORITIES 
 
Some of the detainees held at the naval base in Guantanamo Bay challenged the authority of 
the government to hold them without charges and deny them the right of access to lawyers by 
applying for writs of habeas corpus in a federal court.  These cases are now examined. 
 
In the first case382 the petitioners applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of all captives held in 
Guantanamo Bay. The petitioners alleged that the government held the prisoners in violation 
of both the Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United States because the 
government, firstly, failed to inform them of the nature of the accusations against them; 
secondly, denied them the right to the assistance of counsel; and, thirdly, deprived them of 
their liberty without due process of the law.  The respondents argued that petitioners lacked 
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standing to bring the petition, but even if they could, no federal court had jurisdiction to 
entertain it.  The Court agreed. 
 
The Court found that the petitioners did not have locus standi to lodge any claims on behalf 
of the detainees. The petitioners lacked the required relationship with the detainees to bring 
the cause of action.  Recognizing that the petitioners might attempt to remedy this problem 
by applying for leave to file an amended petition to support the issue of locus standi, the 
Court ruled that such a request would be denied because an amended petition would also not 
satisfy the writ’s jurisdictional requirements.383
 
The Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ because none of the named respondents were 
found within its district. The Court recognized, however, that jurisdiction could lie in a 
district court where anyone in the “chain of command” with control over the prisoners was 
present and that at least some of the respondents identified in the petition were present within 
the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  Accordingly, 
the Court went on to consider whether a transfer of the petition to that district court, in terms 
of the United States Constitution,384 would be appropriate and concluded that such a transfer 
would be inappropriate because that district court also lacked jurisdiction. The Court relied 
on Johnson385 in reaching its conclusion.  The Court found no meaningful distinction 
between the petitioners in Johnson and the detainees in Guantanamo Bay because both 
groups were aliens who had been captured abroad in combat, were identified as enemy 
combatants, were held under the exclusive control of the military, and had never set foot on 
American soil.386  
 
The Court then turned to the remaining question of whether the detainees were “present” in 
the United States by virtue of their detention at the Guantanamo Naval Base. The Court 
found that there was a distinction between territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty, and that 
sovereignty was the key in determining whether the United States exercised jurisdiction or 
sovereignty over the naval base. The Court examined the lease agreement entered into by the 
United States and Cuba in 1903 after the Spanish-American War. The Court found that 
Article III of the agreement clarified the question of sovereignty. The court stated that while, 
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on the one hand, the United States recognized the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of 
the Republic of Cuba over the described areas, the Republic of Cuba, on the other hand, 
consented that during the period of occupation by the United States, the latter would exercise 
complete jurisdiction and control over and within those areas.387   
 
Concluding that it lacked the authority to ignore the parties’ distinction between jurisdiction 
and sovereignty, the Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that the concepts were 
interchangeable. The Court found that in matters that were comparable other federal courts 
had held that the naval base at Guantanamo Bay was outside the sovereign territory of the 
United States, and thus not the functional equivalent of United States territory.388 Finding 
that Cuba retained sovereignty over the naval base, the Court applied the decision in Johnson 
and ruled that the petitioners were not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.  On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that petitioners did not have the locus 
standi to file an application on behalf of the detainees.389  
 
In the second case390 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia was 
confronted with a legal challenge to the detentions at the naval base in Guantanamo Bay.  In 
this case two British and one Australian citizen, and some of their parents, filed an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus requesting access to counsel, the discontinuation of 
interrogations while the litigation was in process and their release.  
 
The Court identified two situations where the writ had been found to apply to aliens. In the 
one case the aliens sought to prove their citizenship and, in the other, sought to be allowed 
into the United States, neither of which were at issue in the petitioners’ case.391 The 
petitioners’ contention that Johnson was inapplicable was rejected by the Court. The 
petitioners’ claim was based on the fact that the government had not determined that they 
were enemy aliens. The Court held that the lack of jurisdiction in Johnson did not “hinge on 
the fact that the petitioners were enemy aliens, but on the fact that they were aliens outside 
territory over which the United States was sovereign.”392  In support of its interpretation, the 
Court referred to Justice Douglas’s observation in Johnson that “the Court’s opinion 
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inescapably denie[d] courts power to afford the least bit of protection for any alien who [was] 
subject to our occupation abroad, even if he [was] neither enemy nor belligerent and even 
after peace [was] officially declared.”393
 
The Court proceeded to consider the issue of whether the naval base at Guantanamo Bay 
should be considered to be within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.394 The 
Court found the petitioners’ reliance on cases involving the rights of aliens residing in 
sovereign territories of the United States misplaced, and recognizing that courts had, in other 
contexts, rejected a de facto sovereignty test for claims involving aliens at the naval base in 
Guantanamo Bay, the Court concluded that the base was outside the sovereign territory of the 
United States.395 In applying Johnson, the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain 
the petitions.396
 
The above finding was confirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit.397 Following the District Court’s interpretation of Johnson, the appellate 
court found that no court had jurisdiction to entertain the petitions, “even if the petitioners 
ha[d] not been adjudicated enemies of the United States”.398  However, the Supreme Court 
has indicated that it would consider whether federal courts lack jurisdiction to deal with 
challenges, by foreign nationals, regarding the legality of their detention at Guantanamo Bay. 
 
Unless the Supreme Court abandoned Johnson, it appeared that a federal court could not 
exercise jurisdiction over the petition of an alien detained at Guantanamo Bay. If a federal 
court could exercise jurisdiction, detainees under The Military Order would enjoy access to 
limited judicial review. It should be noted, however, that, according to The Military Order, 
any individual subject to it “shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any 
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on [his] 
behalf in … any court of the United States”.399   
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A compelling argument exists that since at least September 11, 2001, the United States and 
Al Qaeda have been actively engaged in a war which was declared and initiated by Al Qaeda 
and that the Guantanamo Bay prisoners fall within the category of enemy aliens as identified 
in Johnson. It may also be argued that entertaining petitions from Guantanamo Bay prisoners 
would interfere with the prosecution of the war by the executive branch.  As correctly noted 
by the Court in Johnson, it is difficult to envisage a more limiting restraint on “a field 
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him 
to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military 
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home”.400  Whether the Supreme Court would 
depart from Johnson or distinguish it in any meaningful way, remained to be seen. 
 
It is submitted that the departure from Johnson was dealt with decisively in Hamdan vs 
Rumsfeld.401 This decision changed the view of the United States Administration towards the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees and specifically the Al Qaeda internees. Emphasis is placed on 
three important issues flowing from the decision, which are:  
(i) That the commissions established by The Military Order must comply with the 
laws of war.  
(ii) That the president cannot act beyond the boundaries of domestic law and 
International Law.  
(iii) That legislation passed by Congress should be interpreted as requiring 
compliance, by the United States president, with the laws of war.402  
 
It is submitted that for the Guantanamo Bay detainees this Supreme Court decision is of vital 
importance. According to the United States Administration’s stated policy, the detainees 
would not be accorded the protection of the Third Geneva Convention. In a reversal of their 
policy the United States accepted the Court’s decision that the detainees, particularly the Al 
Qaeda members, were entitled to the protection of the Third Geneva Convention, and, 
specifically, Common Article 3. The Court determined that the eliciting of information from 
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Al Qaeda detainees, by the CIA, by means of torture was unlawful, and a war crime in terms 
of the War Crimes Act.403  
 
In view of the Hamdan vs Rumsfeld decision it is important that the extent of the protection 
for the detainees in terms of the Third Geneva Convention be clarified. It is submitted that 
this issue should be dealt with by considering whether the United States, in terms of 
International Law, can suspend the Geneva Conventions with reference to  Afghanistan and 
Al Qaeda (which it did), or whether they can suspend it in part and only apply specific 
principles relating to the Guantanamo detainees. 
 
One school of thought holds that the Geneva Conventions or part of it can be suspended and 
that this line of thinking is consistent with International Law.404 In support of this position it 
is stated that a general rule exists, which determines that if there is a breach of a multilateral 
treaty, the suspension of the treaty by the aggrieved party is justified in terms of customary 
International Law.405 However, the United States Attorney General’s Office is of the opinion 
that in terms of the United States Constitution, customary International Law is not federal law 
and, therefore, cannot bind the president.406 It does, however, accept that withdrawal from or 
termination of a treaty, due to a breach of its provisions, is recognized in terms of 
International Law.407 It is submitted that, as a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, the 
United States remains bound by the provisions regarding the humane treatment of the 
detainees, notwithstanding the unilateral suspension of their obligations towards a fellow 
signatory, Afghanistan. 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties408 confirms that the suspension of the whole 
treaty or part of it is justified if a breach by one of the parties occurs. The United States is not 
a party to the latter Convention. It is, however, accepted by the United States Attorney 
General’s Office that such a suspension does not include the provisions that disallow the 
inhumane treatment of protected persons.409 It would, therefore, be a breach of customary 
International Law, although the United States president is not bound by it, to suspend the 
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Geneva Conventions in its entirety.410 If the Third Geneva Convention411 is interpreted as 
disallowing suspension, then any suspension thereof, in part or whole, would be a violation of 
International Law. It is submitted that the provisions should not be read as prohibiting any 
suspension at all. A further submission is that the president of the United States, against the 
spirit of International Law, did suspend all United States obligations in terms of the Geneva 
Conventions towards Afghanistan, without taking into consideration the protection of the 
human person. This was manifested in their failure to release the captured combatants after 
the cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan, as well as in the prolonged detention without trial 
of the Guantanamo detainees. 
 
Bybee contends that to accept that there can be no temporary suspension of specific 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions during a conflict would be wrong, because the Geneva 
Conventions do not provide for such a limitation. Also it would be senseless to include an all-
encompassing non-suspension rule in International Law because then the aggrieved party 
would have no recourse against an enemy who commits a grave breach in terms of a 
treaty.412 However, it is submitted that the Third Geneva Convention413 can be interpreted in 
a manner that allows the aggrieved State to claim war reparations from the State that 
committed the breach.
 
In view of the above, Bybee contends that should the United States president suspend certain 
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention, it would not prevent the United States from 
applying the principles of these provisions as a matter of policy. Therefore, the United States 
can, as a matter of policy, decide that the Guantanamo Bay detainees should be treated as if 
they are prisoners of war, although they have not been accorded such status in terms of the 
Third Geneva Convention.414 It is submitted that a decision to treat the detainees as prisoners 
of war would be in the interest of captured United States combatants. This decision was 
forced upon the United States president by the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan vs 
Rumsfeld. The Court directed the president to accord the Guantanamo Bay detainees the 
                                                 
410   Bybee 23. 
411    Article 1. 
412   Bybee 24. 
413   Article 131; Pictet Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention 630. 
414  Bybee 25; Article 4.  
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protection of the Third Geneva Convention415 with regard to due process of the law and 
humane treatment. 
 
It is submitted that the Hamdan vs Rumsfeld decision, which guarantees the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees protection in terms of the Third Geneva Convention, has introduced a different 
dimension to the particular situation of Al Qaeda.  The reality is that Al Qaeda is not a State 
and clearly does not conform to the laws and customs of war. Al Qaeda combatants are not a 
conventional army as they are recruited from different countries. It is submitted that they do 
not, in a legal sense, fall within the ambit of the Third Geneva Convention and, therefore, 
should be treated as prisoners of war irrespective of their not being accorded prisoner of war 
status by a competent tribunal. A further submission is that the drafters of the Conventions 
clearly believed that the principle of humanity should enjoy precedence over issues of 
uniform, allegiance, race or the nature of a conflict. This belief is reflected in the 
chronological precedence given to the content of Article 3 over that of Article 4. The 
Hamdan vs Rumsfeld decision supports the foregoing contention. 
 
As far as the military commissions are concerned, the United States president believed that he 
was acting within the ambit of his executive authority when he issued The Military Order that 
authorizes the establishment of military commissions to try the captured Taliban and Al 
Qaeda detainees in contravention of the Third Geneva Convention. This was challenged by 
the accused in Hamdan vs Rumsfeld. The Court ruled against the president and emphasized 
that Congress did not authorize the commissions.416  
 
The Court stated that the commissions were contrary to the Uniform Code of Practise and the 
Geneva Conventions.417 These instruments direct the president to establish properly 
constituted military courts, and stipulate that the duty to determine the rules governing 
captives or the execution of the laws of war is not the prerogative of the president, but that of 
the United States Congress. The Court held that the application of admissibility rules of 
evidence in courts martial was preferable to those applied in the military commissions. The 
admissibility rules governing the commissions allow for the admissibility of evidence against 
                                                 
415  Common Article 3 to all four Conventions.  
416  Hamdan vs Rumsfeld available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5521073  
(accessed on 3 July, 2006).   
417        Totenburg (accessed on 21 July, 2006); Hamdan vs Rumsfeld 25-30.  
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an accused, which the latter might not have had an opportunity to test. This untested evidence 
could have been elicited from the accused by means of torture. 
 
A former United States Attorney General, Goldsmith, is of the opinion that although the 
Court in Hamdan vs Rumsfeld has rejected the military commissions, nothing prevents the 
indefinite detention, without trial, of a detainee.418 If an individual is proved to be an Al 
Qaeda member, he can be detained indefinitely until the cessation of hostilities, which may 
never happen. On the other hand, the Court rejected the Administration’s argument that the 
federal courts could not be seized with issues of military justice. The Court found that the 
federal courts are constitutionally bound to protect civil liberties and the attacks thereupon. It 
is submitted that Hamdan vs Rumsfeld opened the door for the Guantanamo Bay detainees to 
challenge their continued detention in the federal courts of the United States.419      
 
A further submission is that the Hamdan vs Rumsfeld decision created a difficult situation for 
the Bush Administration given that some of the detainees incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay 
would continue to pose a threat, if released. The decision opened an avenue for the United 
States government to approach Congress for clear legislative directives on how to deal with 
those who pose a threat. It is submitted that in view of the Supreme Court decision, Congress 
would not lightly consent to or enact any legislation that gives the president unbridled power 
to ignore the Constitution or the laws of war. 
 
However, in September 2006, the United States Congress did exactly that. Congress passed a 
new Bill420 which stipulates, amongst others, that: 
(i) The right to habeas corpus is annulled for all non-United States citizens and is 
applied retrospectively to all the detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. 
(ii) The president is authorized to determine what constitutes torture. 
(iii) United States officials are granted retrospective immunity for the authorisation or 
commission of acts of torture. 
(iv) Detainees are prohibited from invoking the protections of the Geneva Conventions. 
(v) The president is authorized to interpret and apply the Geneva Conventions according 
to his sole discretion. 
                                                 
418       Totenburg “Supreme Court Blocks Guantanamo Tribunals” [online] available at  
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5520809 (accessed on 21 July, 2006).  
419  Ibid. 
420       The Military Commissions Act of 2006. 
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(vi) The president has the right to convene military commissions for the prosecution of 
unlawful enemy combatants, and is allowed to accord such status to any person for 
whatever reason on his sole authority. 
(vii) Civilians can be tried by military commissions and there are limitations on a 
detainee’s right to representation by the counsel of choice. 
(viii) Evidence obtained by torture can be used against the accused. 
(ix) Classified evidence can be used but not made available to the defence. 
(x) Hearsay evidence and coerced testimony can be used. 
(xi) Military commissions can impose death sentences. 
(xii) Secret and indefinite detentions are allowed.421   
 
It is submitted that this new development has effectively robbed the United States Supreme 
Court of its independence, the United States Constitution of its power, the Geneva 
Conventions of its vision and the world of its humanity.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
It is submitted that the United States, in refusing to accord prisoner of war status to the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees and by denying them due process of the law, is in violation of 
International Law and the United States Constitution. In terms of the Geneva Conventions 
and with regard to the passage of the Military Commissions Act, the United States has 
committed grave breaches for which it should be held accountable. It is submitted, in 
concurrence with Hamdan vs Rumsfeld, that the detainees are prisoners of war in terms of the 
Third Convention and are entitled to a fair trial.   
                                                 
421       The Erosion of Democracy & Freedom in the United States of America [online] available at  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
International Humanitarian Law finds application during situations of armed conflict between 
States or between a State and an aggrieved part of the population of that State. However, the 
nature of armed conflict has evolved to such an extent that the existing definition needs to be 
broadened to include conflicts outside the present parameters of conflict within State borders. 
It is submitted that the definition should include armed conflicts against a State by any 
resistance grouping based outside the borders of a specific State. 
 
The purpose of International Humanitarian Law is, firstly, to protect the rights of combatants 
captured during armed conflicts, as well as the rights of civilians and non-combatants, such 
as medical and religious personnel; secondly, to hold States and individuals accountable, 
during wartime, for the illegal acts and abuses by its armed forces; thirdly, to prevent 
discrimination against captured combatants and to uphold basic human rights, such as the 
right to a fair trial and, finally, to provide protection against inhumane treatment for captured 
combatants during armed conflict.   
 
International Humanitarian Law attempts to ensure that armed forces adhere to humanitarian 
principles. Combatants are expected to respect the laws of war, while government leaders and 
their heads of armies are expected to prevent human rights violations and to protect civilians. 
During armed conflicts all violations of human rights constitute unacceptable breaches of the 
basic standards of humane behaviour that are to be expected in a civilized society.     
 
During the Afghanistan conflict the United States and its allies have on more than one 
occasion insisted that their captured combatants and civilians be treated in accordance with 
the Geneva Conventions. Earlier press statements released by the United States regarding 
their treatment of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay signaled their awareness that these 
prisoners, whether legal or illegal combatants, have to be afforded certain basic human rights. 
Notwithstanding this recognition of the prisoners’ rights, the United States failed to convene 
suitable forums for establishing the status of the detainees. This failure, it would appear, was 
a strategy to circumvent the possible assignation of prisoner of war status to the detainees 
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because of the obligations that it would place upon the United States regarding due process 
and other related obligations. Through their actions the United States displayed a selective 
application of International Humanitarian Law, which suited their particular needs in the so-
called War on Terror. In September 2006, however, the United States abandoned all pretence 
of upholding International Humanitarian Law. The United States Congress passed the 
Military Commissions Act, which empowers the president and other government officials to 
violate the principles embodied in the Geneva Conventions. 
 
It is submitted that if one takes into account that the purpose of formulating International 
Humanitarian Law was not to protect States or groups, but the individual against his captors, 
then it is irrelevant whether the individual was captured during a conflict between two States 
or a State and a particular group within its borders. Therefore, it should follow that 
individuals who are members of Al Qaeda or similar groups should enjoy the protections 
afforded to prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention. It is submitted that 
objective criteria are needed to determine who should qualify as a prisoner of war and that 
these criteria should not be clouded by the needs, perspectives and ideologies of the parties to 
the conflict. Civilized society cannot be governed on the basis of an eye for an eye. Instead, 
individuals who commit war crimes should be held accountable in terms of the Geneva 
Conventions.       
 
Atrocities were committed on both sides during the Afghanistan conflict. Therefore it is 
submitted that International Law should be applied even-handedly to both sides to limit the 
commission of atrocities and revenge attacks and their potential to worsen the conflict 
situation.  
 
Finally, it is submitted that, in view of the aforementioned, the Guantanamo Bay detainees 
are prisoners of war as determined by the Third Geneva Convention.  
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